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Klingele: The Early Demise of Early Release

THE EARLY DEMISE OF EARLY RELEASE
Cecelia Klingele*
ABSTRACT
Reversing the tough-on-crime policies that have defined American
criminal justice for the past two decades, cash-strapped states across the nation
have begun reducing the number of people they confine in prisons and jails. In
their efforts to reduce correctional populations, numerous states have passed
laws that allow parole boards, prison officials, or judges to shorten the sentences
of people already serving time in custody. These so-called "early release" laws
have proven highly controversial and in at least three states have been repealed
outright. In others, they remain on the books but have provided less savings than
anticipated because of the failure of decisionmakers to utilize their newlyconferred authority. This Article examines the early demise of early release in
several jurisdictions, identifying practical, political, and moral obstacles to the
practice of early release that may account for the failure of recent legislation.
Responding to those concerns, I suggest principles to guide future efforts to
reduce custodial populations through the use of early release. These include
drafting laws that respect the limits of institutional capacity, adopting principled
rules about who may be released early and for what reasons, and emphasizing
the moral concerns that justify efforts to reduce prison populations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, American correctional populations have
soared, and along with them, so have the human and financial costs of confining
people in jails and prisons. In response, states have mounted various efforts to
decrease the number of people behind bars. These efforts, many of which predated the recent fiscal crisis,' have gathered steam since the sharp market decline that occurred in the fall of 2008.
In recent years, states have passed laws that address the problem of
mass incarceration from a variety of angles. Some of these laws offer opportunities for those charged with or convicted of crimes to avoid incarceration through
participation in rehabilitative programs, community service, and other community-based programming. 2 Others provide for intermediate sanctions for persons
under pre- or post-incarceral supervision, as an alternative to revocation.3 Still
others offer a means by which prisoners may shorten their prison terms.4
Many of these fledgling efforts have had a measurable effect on state
criminal justice systems. In 2009, twenty-four jurisdictions saw a reduction in
the size of their prison populations.5 Yet many efforts to reduce custodial populations have been met with public and institutional resistance. This has been
particularly true with respect to legislation that authorizes the early release of
I

See, e.g., Ryan S. King, Recent Developments in State Parole Reform, 2004-2006, 20 FED.
124-26 (2007) (reporting "twenty-two states enacted legislative reforms to their
sentencing policies or adopted reforms affecting probation and parole revocation procedures"
from 2004-2006, the vast majority of which expanded access to noncustodial options); Jon Wool
& Don Stemen, Changing Fortunes or Changing Attitudes? Sentencing and Corrections Reforms
in 2003, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 294 (2004) (discussing early cost saving measures undertaken by
the states).
SENT'G REP.

2

See ADRIENNE

AUSTIN,

CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRENDS:

KEY

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

IN

SENTENCING POLICY, 2001-2010, 8 (2010), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ccp-

sentencingtrends.pdf.
3

See, e.g., MARSHALL CLEMENT, MATTHEW SCHWARZFELD & MICHAEL THOMPSON, THE

NATIONAL SUMMIT ON JUSTICE REINVESTMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY: ADDRESSING RECIDIVISM,

CRIME,

AND

CORRECTIONS

SPENDING,

56-59

(2011),

available

at

http://www.bja.gov/pdflCSGJusticeReinvestmentSummitReport.pdf.
4

See VERA INST. OF JUST., THE CONTINUING FISCAL CRISIS IN CORRECTIONS: SETrING A NEW

COURSE, 17-18 (2010), available at http://www.vera.org/download?file=3072/The-continuingfiscal-crisis-in-corrections-10-2010-updated.pdf.
s

NICOLE D.

DEVELOPMENTS

PORTER,

IN

THE SENTENCING

POLICY

AND

PROJECT, THE STATE

PRACTICE

OF

(2011),

http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/Final%20State%20of/
ncing%202010.pdf.
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prisoners. 6 Such laws have been underutilized in many jurisdictions and repealed entirely in others.
This Article examines the apparent causes of the failure of early release
laws, as measured by their sustainability, administrability, and ability to produce
long-term changes in carceral policy. Concluding that most early release efforts
are not grounded in a principled approach to sentence reduction, the Article then
suggests ways legislators and policymakers might more effectively structure
future early release laws.
Part I explores the background behind the recent "renaissance" 7 of early
release legislation, and discusses why states have recently become willing and
able to experiment with laws that allow prisoners to leave custody before the
expiration of their sentences. Part ll illustrates the complexity of states' experience with early release legislation, describing how such laws have fared in
Washington, Kansas, Illinois, New Jersey, Wisconsin, and California. Part III
evaluates state experimentation with early release, discussing measures of success and pointing to factors that have contributed to the rapid demise of early
release in many jurisdictions. Part IV looks to the future and suggests principles
that should guide any future efforts to reduce custodial populations through the
use of early release mechanisms. These include drafting laws that respect the
limits of institutional capacity, adopting principled rules about who may be released early and for what reasons, and attending to the moral justifications for
reducing prison populations.
II. EXPLAINING THE RESURGENCE OF EARLY RELEASE LEGISLATION
In order to appreciate the fragile and contentious role that early release
plays in American sentencing policy, it is important to remember that for more
than half a century, "early" release from prison was the rule, not the exception,
in penal practice.8 Under the indeterminate sentencing systems in widespread
use throughout the country in the early to mid-twentieth century, courts imposed

See infra Part III.
See Michael O'Hear, The Early-Release Renaissance:Reflections and a Legislative Update,
at
2011),
available
25,
(Feb.
FAC.
BLOG
SCH.
L.
MARQ.
http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2011/02/25/the-early-release-renaissance-reflections-and-alegislative-update/.
6

8

See JEREMY TRAVIS & SARAH LAWRENCE, BEYOND THE PRISON GATES: THE STATE OF
at
available
(2002),
2
AMERICA
IN

PAROLE

http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/310583 beyond prison gates.pdf. ("[D]espite differences
between the indeterminate sentencing model and the reality of sentencing practice, . . . parole was
firmly embedded in American jurisprudence for the 50-year period from the early 1920s to the
early 1970s."). Before the institution of paroling systems, prisoners were routinely released via
executive clemency. See CHRISTEN JENSEN, THE PARDONING POWER INTHE AMERICAN STATES (U.

Chi. ed. 1922); Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1175-90 (2010).
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maximum terms of confinement in felony cases9 and allowed parole boards to
determine the actual moment of release based on largely subjective assessments
of prisoners' moral rehabilitation.o In these indeterminate sentencing systems,
early release was the desired norm: failure to secure parole before the termination of the sentence was a sign that the system had failed to achieve its rehabilitative ends.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, doubts about the fairness of the indeterminate sentence led many jurisdictions to move the time of release closer to the
term of years announced in open court, thereby purportedly increasing the
"truthfulness" of the original sentence." Over the following quarter-century,
state after state dramatically restricted routine parole eligibility.12 At the same
time, many states circumscribed other methods of early release, reducing the
amount of good time credit that could be accumulated and, in some instances,
eliminating access to medical parole. 13 By the late 1990s, the vast majority of
states had imposed firm restrictions on the amount of time prisoners were required to serve in custody, often prohibiting release before 85% or more of the
sentence had been served, particularly in cases involving the commission of
serious felony offenses.14
Recent efforts to expand or re-authorize opportunities for early release
mark a stark change to this recent trend and suggest a retreat from the sentencing policy of the 1980s and 90s. After several decades of getting "tough on
crime," lawmakers are-for the moment, at least-expressing a newfound willingness to re-examine the necessity of imposing lengthy sentences in some cas-

IndeterminateSentence Laws: The Adolescence of PenocorrectionalLegislation, 50 HARV.
L. REv. 677, 678 (1937) (noting that thirty-nine jurisdictions at that time employed indeterminate
sentencing laws, with all of these prescribing maximum penalties and the majority prescribing
minimum penalties, as well).
10
For a critique of the arbitrary nature of parole release decisions, see Marvin E. Frankel,
Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1972).
Whatever the qualities of prison life itself . . . parole officials carry on for the
most part the motif of Kafka's nightmares. It has been expressed by the United States Board of Parole almost as a matter of pride that the judgment whether or when a prisoner will be released is inscrutable.
Id. The utilitarian and retributivist philosophers of the 18th and 19th century took an equally dim
9

view of clemency decision-making. KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 23-54 (1989).
"

See, e.g., PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, SPECIAL REPORT: BUREAU OF JUSTICE

STATISTICS,

TRUTH

IN

SENTENCING

IN

STATE

PRISONS

3

(1999),

available

at

http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf (describing abolition of parole in fourteen states).
12

See WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., THE INFLUENCE OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING

REFORMS ON

CHANGES IN STATES' SENTENCING PRACTICES AND PRISON POPULATIONS 7 (2002), available at

http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/195161.pdf
13 WIS. STAT. §§ 302.113(3)(a), 302.114(3)(a) (1999) (establishing "bad time").
14

SABOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 11.
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es, and ensuring such sentences are served in full. This change can be explained
by both theoretical and practical developments in criminal justice policy.
A growing awareness of the human and financial costs of mass incarceration has led many jurisdictions to a bipartisan reevaluation of the number of
people in prison and kinds of offenses for which incarceration is being imposed.
This reevaluation has been aided in concrete terms by the support of nonprofit
entities and government grants that have drawn policymakers' attention to the
problems that attend mass incarceration. These practical resources have enabled
a growing number of jurisdictions to conduct more sophisticated analysis of
their criminal justice systems, develop and implement laws designed to transfer
money from prisons to community-based public safety efforts, and measure the
effectiveness of newly-enacted policies."
The Problem of Overincarceration

A.

Among those familiar with American carceral policy, the proposition
that too many people are behind bars is now conventional wisdom. 6 The United
States has the world's highest incarceration rate, imprisoning approximately one
of every 132 people,17 a rate six times higher than the world median." As scholars have documented, by every measure, the scope of imprisonment in the
United States wildly exceeds that of any other country.19

15
Chief among these efforts is The Center for State Governments' Justice Center. See infra
Part II.B. For an overview of the Justice Center's Reinvestment Initiative, see THE COUNCIL OF

STATE

GOVERNMENTS,

JUSTICE

REINVESTMENT

(2010),

available

at

http://justicereinvestment.org/files/JRoverview_2010_rev.pdf.
16
Cf Joan Petersilia, Beyond the PrisonBubble, 75 FED. PROBATION 2 (2011)
[V]irtually all those who study the matter now agree that imprisonment has
reached often counterproductive levels, particularly in the case of drug possession and other nonviolent crimes. . . . In my travels around the country I
have conducted an unscientific survey of prison administrators, and nearly all
of them say that 10 to 15 percent of their inmates could be safely released.

Id.
17

Roy WALMSLEY, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON POPULATION

LIST (8th ed. 2008), available at http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/downloads/wppl8th 41.pdf. If only adults are considered, the rate increases to one of every 100. See PEW CTR.
FOR THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA IN 2008, 5 (2009), available at

http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/One%20in%20100.pdf.
18
WALMSLEY, supranote 17.
See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRISONS: HOW TO REDUCE
19

CRIME AND END MASS INCARCERATION (2005); David Garland, The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1-2 (DAVID GARLAND, ed.

2001). Notably, the country with the second highest incarceration rate is Russia at 629.
WALMSLEY, supra note 17. Other country's rates include Ukraine, 323; Spain, 160; England, 153;
Australia, 129; France, 96; and Germany, 89. Id.
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The United States exceeds other countries in punishment severity, too. 20
Offenses in the United States are much less likely to be sanctioned with fines
than in many other nations, 2 1 and terms of imprisonment are frequently lengthened through the application of penalty enhancers and mandatory minimum
sentences. 22 After prisoners have served their sentences, lasting consequences
remain. Registration provisions, limitations on residence, disenfranchisement,
and restrictions on receipt of professional licenses and public benefits all continue to affect former prisoners for many years (and sometimes for a lifetime)
after their formal sentences have expired.23 The stigma of incarceration is borne
by a broad swath of Americans, but there is no question that it falls disproportionately on minorities, particularly those with limited formal education.24
As the number of people who are or have been imprisoned increases,
the widespread effect of mass imprisonment has been deeply felt not only by
those who are incarcerated but by the communities in which they reside. More
than half of prisoners have minor children whose living situations are often disrupted by parental incarceration.2 5 These children are three times more likely
20

One reason why the United States has the world's highest imprisonment rate is
that, when sentence severity is calculated relative to recorded offenses, much
harsher aggregate prison sentences (expected time served) are doled out than
elsewhere. For rape, burglary, and assault, aggregate years' imprisonment per
1,000 recorded offenses is substantially higher than elsewhere; aggregate imprisonment for robbery is exceeded only by Australia, and for M[otor)
V[ehicle] T[heft] only by the Netherlands and Australia. Only for homicide
are aggregate U.S. imprisonment years in the mainstream.
ALFRED BLUMSTEIN ET AL., CROSS-NATIONAL MEASURES OF PUNITIVENESS, in 33 CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT INWESTERN COUNTRIES, 1980-1999 347, 359 (2005). When punitiveness is measured more narrowly as expected time served per conviction, the United States stands out even
more starkly. Id. at 375.
21
Sally T. Hillsman, Fines and Day Fines, 12 CRIME & JUST. 49, 52 (1990) (comparing European and American use of fines).
22
Frank 0. Bowman, 1II, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 367, 376 (2010) (discussing the
expansion of penalty-enhancing statutes). In the fall of 2011, the Editors of the New York Times
deplored the tripling of life without parole sentences between 1992 and 2008 from 12,453 to
41,095, "even though violent crime declined sharply all over the country during that period." The
Misuse of Life Without Parole,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2011; see also ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S.
KING, No EXIT: THE EXPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA (July 2009), available at
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/incnoexitseptember2009.pdf.
23
See generally INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind, eds. 2002).
24
Almost half of American black men without high school diplomas will spend time in prison.
BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT & INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 34 (2006). See also ALEXANDER, supra
note 19; Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarcerationin African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1271 (2004).
25

SARAH SCHIRMER ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR

TRENDS
1991-2007
2
(2009),
available
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc-incarceratedparents.pdf
CHILDREN:

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol114/iss2/5
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than their peers to exhibit antisocial behavior 26 and are more than twice as likely
27
to suffer from mental health problems.
But incarceration does not just affect prisoners' immediate family members. As released prisoners return to their communities, their high rates of unemployment, lack of stable housing, and inability to engage in the political life
of the community are all residual consequences of imprisonment that contribute
to the destabilization of the poor, and often minority, neighborhoods in which
many of them reside.28
Were these detrimental incidents of incarceration offset by significant
increases in public safety attributable to mass incarceration, either through decreased crime or recidivism, then perhaps they might be justifiable. However,
even the most positive assessments of the effect of imprisonment on crime suggest that incapacitation of known offenders accounts for only a limited portion
of the steady reduction in crime that occurred from the 1990s through the
present.2 9 Moreover, data indicate that well over half the individuals who spend
time in prison return to custody within three years of release-a figure that suggests prison does little to improve the criminogenic tendencies of those within
its walls.30 In light of the limited gains and significant losses that attend the
widespread use of incarceration, particularly in cases involving less serious
criminal offenses, there is good reason to question whether current practice is
morally defensible.
Normative concerns about the scale and consequences of mass incarceration have played a role in recent legislative changes to state sentencing and
correctional practices, but so far the role has been modest. It is the financial,
rather than the human, cost of imprisonment that has received the most attention.3 That cost is not insignificant. States are now estimated to spend more
Joseph Murray & David P. Farrington, The Effects of ParentalImprisonment on Children,
37 CRIME AND JUST. 133, 140 (2008).
27
Id. at 157.
28
See generally TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: How MASS INCARCERATION
MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007); see also WESTERN, supra note 24, at
109-11; AMY L. SOLOMON ET AL., FROM PRISON TO WORK: THE EMPLOYMENT DIMENSIONS OF
PRISONER REENTRY: A REPORT OF THE REENTRY ROUNDTABLE (2004), available at
26

http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/411097_FromPrison toWork.pdf (discussing obstacles to
employment faced by persons leaving prison).
29
See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: FourFactorsthat
Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163 (2004) (concluding that "the

increase in incarceration over the 1990s can account for . . . one-third of the observed decline in
crime"); see also JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., UNLOCKING AMERICA: WHY AND How To REDUCE
AMERICA'S PRISON POPULATION 3-14 (2007) (summarizing research on the effects of imprisonment on criminal offending); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE

(2007).
30

AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 16.

31
See, e.g., VERA INST. JUST., THE CONTINUING FISCAL CRISIS IN CORRECTIONS 5 (2010)
("There can be little question that the fiscal crisis ... has served as a catalyst for lawmakers to
at
available
how."),
and
punished
is
who
reconsider
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than $50 billion annually on costs associated with corrections.3 2 Correctional
expenditures have consumed an increasing portion of state budgets over the past
decade,33 a trend driven by a number of factors, not least of which is the skyrocketing cost of providing medical care for an increasingly elderly prisoner
population. A handful of states have already seen spending on prisons outstrip
spending on higher education. 35 As states struggle with shrinking budgets and
growing demands by other consumers of government resources, resource constraints mingled with deeper moral qualms have led many to conclude that
change in prison policy is both needed and inevitable.
B.

The Tools of Change

Concerns over the human and social costs of mass incarceration have
increased lawmakers' willingness to entertain the idea of reducing the number
of people in prison. Their practical and political ability to pass laws reducing prison populations has been greatly aided by two related policy developments and by
technical support recently made available to states through key non-profit organizations.
The first development is the emergence of the prisoner re-entry movement. Although the trajectory of prison growth was well-documented throughout the 1990s, it was not until the end of that decade that commentators and
scholars began emphasizing the degree to which prison served as a revolving
door for many individuals. Only seven percent of American prisoners serve a
http://www.vera.org/download?file=3072/The-continuing-fiscal-crisis-in-corrections-10-2010updated.pdf; Charlie Savage, Trend to Lighten Harsh Sentences Catches On in Conservative
States, N.Y.. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2011, at A14. ("While liberals have long complained that harsh
mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent offenses like drug possession are unjust, the push to
overhaul penal policies has been increasingly embraced by elected officials in some of the most
conservative states in the country. And for a different reason: to save money.").
32

PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS
11

(2009), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/PSPPlin31_
reportFINALWEB_3-26-09.pdf.
3
CHRISTINE S. SCOTT-HAYWARD, THE FISCAL CRISIS IN CORRECTIONS: RETHINKING POLICIES
AND

PRACTICES

3

(2009),

available

at

http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/vera-state-budgets.pdf (citing data compiled
by the National Association of State Budget Officers).
34
By virtue of their inability to secure basic medical care on their own in the community,
prisoners are constitutionally entitled to state funded treatment for serious medical needs. Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The elderly comprise the fastest-growing and most expensive
segment of the American prison population. CARRIE ABNER, GRAYING PRISONS: STATES FACE
CHALLENGES
OF
AN
AGING
INMATE
POPULATION
9
(2006),
available at

http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/sn061l 1GrayingPrisons.pdf.
3

PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS INAMERICA 2008 16 (2008),

availableat http://pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTSPrisonO8_FINAL_2-1 1_FORWEB.pdf (listing Vermont, Michigan, Oregon, Connecticut, and Delaware as spending
more on corrections than higher education).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol114/iss2/5
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death or life sentence.36 The rest spend one or more years in prison before returning to the community. 37 The transition from prison to community is a difficult one, and studies conducted in the mid-1990s revealed that anywhere from
one-half to two-thirds of released prisoners were re-arrested within three years of
release, with most of the failure occurring within the first six months on the
street. Later research has yielded a rich picture of the challenges confronting
those leaving prison and of the interventions that can help former prisoners desist from crime.39
Once highlighted, the importance of re-entry to criminal justice policy
became evident to a broad coalition of interest groups, policymakers, legislators,
and criminal justice system actors. 4 0 Illustrating the degree to which the importance of re-entry gained popular acceptance was President George W. Bush's
2004 State of the Union address, in which he observed:
This year, some 600,000 inmates will be released from prison
back into society. We know from long experience that if they
can't find work[,] or a home[,] or help, they are much more
likely to commit . . . [more crimes] and return to prison....

36

JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 3 (2003).

Id. ("[A]lthough the average prison term served is now 2.5 years, many prison terms are
short enough so that forty-four percent of all those now housed in state prisons are expected to be
37

released within the year.").
3

Id. at 11-12 (thirty percent of released prisoners rearrested in six months, forty-four percent

in the first year, and sixty-eight percent within three years of release).
3
For a small sample of the many publications that touch on re-entry, see FAYE S. TAXMAN ET
AL., FROM PRISON SAFETY TO PUBLIC SAFETY: INNOVATIONS IN OFFENDER REENTRY (2002);
JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., FAMILIES LEFT BEHIND: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF INCARCERATION AND

REENTRY,

(2005),

available

at

http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310882_families left behind.pdf; JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT
THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER RE-ENTRY (2005); Joan Petersilia,

What Works in PrisonerReentry? Reviewing and Questioningthe Evidence, 68 FED. PROBATION 4
(2004); Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of
Felon Disenfranchisementin the UnitedStates, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 777 (2002); Christy A. Visher,
ReturningHome: EmergingFindings and Policy Lessons about PrisonerReentry, 20 FED. SENT'G
REP. 93 (2008).
40
Reflecting on the tenth anniversary of Janet Reno's first call for proposals to develop state
re-entry partnerships and initiatives, Jeremy Travis observed:
The coalition of support for new approaches to prisoner reentry is broad and
bipartisan, a stunning achievement in an era of heightened partisanship. The
legislative strategy group that convened to support the Second Chance Act included George Soros's Open Society Institute and Chuck Colson's Prison Fellowship. The cosponsors of the Second Chance Act included representatives

of the Congressional Black Caucus and the evangelical wing of the Republican Party. The Reentry Policy Council, created by the Council of State Governments, included Republicans and Democrats in key leadership roles.
Jeremy Travis, Reflections on the Re-entry Movement, 20 FED. SENT'G REP. 84, 84 (2007).
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America is the land of second chance, and when the gates of the
prison open, the path ahead should lead to a better life. 4 1
Lawmakers backed up that aspiration with action. They did so first
through the Serious and Violent Offender Re-entry Initiative, which earmarked
$130 million in state grants for re-entry initiatives,4 2 and later with the passage
of the Second Chance Act of 2007,43 which authorized $340 million in funding
for programs and research to improve outcomes for people leaving jails and
prisons." Through subsequent appropriations, the law has enabled states to receive substantial assistance in developing and evaluating re-entry programs.45
Efforts to improve re-entry outcomes did not on their face call into
question the propriety of punishment, however harsh. Nevertheless, as law and
policymakers became increasingly aware of the number and nature of the obstacles that exist, they also became more sensitive to the ways in which prolonged incarceration increases risks to public safety. It soon became clear that,
from a re-entry perspective, much harm could be avoided if offenders could be
punished in their communities, rather than by removing them from their jobs,
families, schooling, and other stabilizing influences. For that reason, the re-entry
movement should be acknowledged as an indirect but important influence behind the passage of early release laws during the first decade of the twenty-first
century.
A second important precursor to recent legislative changes was the rise
of so-called "evidence-based practices" in criminal justice. 46 Writing in 2002,
41

42

President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004).
Travis, supra note 40, at 85.

Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008).
Michael O'Hear, The Second Chance Act and the Future ofReentry Reform, 20
REP. 75, 76 (2007).
43
4

45

See

Second

Chance Act,

Appropriations Update,

REENTRY

FED. SENT'G

POL'Y

COUNCIL,

http://reentrypolicy.org/government-affairs/second-chance act (last visited Oct. 19, 2011) (reporting $25 million in appropriations for Second Chance Act programs in fiscal year 2009, "including $15 million for state and local reentry demonstration projects and $10 million for grants to
nonprofit organizations for mentoring and other transitional services" and $114 million was appropriated for prisoner reentry programs in the Department of Justice along with $108 million for
programs in the Department of Labor during fiscal year 2010). Additional research and state implementation efforts have been greatly aided by funding from private foundations. See, e.g.,
ELIZABETH GAYNES, REENTRY: HELPING FORMER PRISONERS RETURN TO COMMUNITIES (2005),

availableat http://www.aecforg/upload/publicationfiles/ir2980d32.pdf; Will Bunch, The Helping
Former Prisoners Reenter Society: The Health Link Project, in 12 To IMPROVE HEALTH AND

HEALTH CARE (Stephen L. Isaacs & David C. Colby, eds. 2008), available at
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/anthology2009.chapter7.pdf.
46
"Evidence-based practices" began in the field of medicine when, in the early 1990s, medical
researchers began to advocate for a "paradigm shift" in the way physicians diagnose and treat
patients. Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach
to Teaching the Practice of Medicine, 268 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2420, 2420-21 (1992). See also
Jeffrey A. Claridge & Timothy C. Fabian, History and Development ofEvidence-Based Medicine,
29 WORLD J. SURGERY 547 (2005). Under a traditional approach, doctors would diagnose and treat
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David Farrington began urging the adoption of research-based programs in the
criminal justice system, observing:
Unfortunately, "crime prevention today as in the past has a tendency to be driven more by rhetoric than reality." Effective
public policy and practice needs to be based on scientific evidence. This is an approach that has garnered much support in
medicine and other fields dedicated to the betterment of society.
It is not, however, the standard usually adopted in crime preventions and criminal justice. Anecdotal evidence, program favorites of the month, and political ideology seemingly drive much
of the crime policy agenda. As a result, we are left with a patchwork of programs that are of unknown potential in preventing
*47
crime.
Earlier resistance to an "evidence-based" approach to criminal justice can be
explained both by the politicization of American criminal justice policy and by the
dearth of evaluative scholarship on the effectiveness of criminal justice interventions. 4 8 Aside from several high profile studies of prison programs conillness based on ad hoc observations, the opinions of their peers, and their own past personal experiences. Id. The evidence-based practice movement sought to upend that approach, encouraging
physicians instead to root their practice in scientifically-validated studies conducted in clinical
settings and reports published in peer reviewed journals. Id. While acknowledging that studies
will often be wrong or inconclusive, advocates of evidence-based practices sought to educate
physicians to be researchers themselves, grounding their decisions in educated judgment, informed by a deep understanding of the current state of medical knowledge. Id That approach to
medicine was quickly translated to other scientific fields requiring clinical judgment, such as
nursing and psychology, and then to the social sciences, where it began to affect practitioners'
approaches to fields such as education and criminology. See, e.g., RALPH C. SERIN, EVIDENCEBASED PRACTICE: PRINCIPLES FOR ENHANCING CORRECTIONAL RESULTS IN PRISONS (2005), avoilable at http://static.nicic.gov/Library/021139.pdf; Elizabeth K. Drake et al., Evidence-Based Public
Policy Options to Reduce Crime and CriminalJustice Costs: Implications in Washington State, 4
VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 170 (2009), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/09-001201.pdf, Lyndee M. Knox & Cheryl B. Aspy, Quality Improvement as a Tool for Translating
Evidence Based Interventions Into Practice: What the Youth Violence Prevention Community can
Learnfrom Healthcare,48 AM. J. COMMUNITY. PSYCHOL. 56 (2011); Roger K. Warren, EvidenceBased Sentencing: Are We Up to the Task?, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 153 (2010).
47
Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Preventing Crime, in EVIDENCE BASED CRIME PREVENTION
(Lawrence W. Sherman et al., eds. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
48
The reasons for this dearth of quantitative information are many. First, programs have traditionally been evaluated more by "feel" than by quantifiable proof The "success" of programs is
often measured by their popularity with administrators, participants, and the public, rather than on
the degree to which they achieve their goals. (An infamous example of this phenomenon is the
wildly popular Drug Abuse Resistance Education program, which began in 1983 as a tool for
educating school children on the dangers of drug abuse and continues to bring police officers into
schools to teach children about drugs even though formal evaluations have consistently demonstrated that children who complete the program use drugs at the same rate as children not exposed
to the program. See Letter from Marjorie E. Kanof, Director, Healthcare-Clinical and Military
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ducted in the 1970s that suggested many prison-based programs failed to
achieve their stated rehabilitative ends, 49 historically very little systematic research has been conducted regarding the most effective ways to help offenders
*
*
50
desist from criminal
activity.
Formal program evaluations require time, money, and trained researchers-assets that underfunded criminal justice agencies frequently lack. Consequently, early efforts at correctional program evaluation tended to be sponsored
by university-affiliated academics and a handful of large research institutes. 5
As appreciation for evidence-based models has permeated the criminal justice system over the past decade, however, resources for identifying best practices in
correctional supervision and re-entry through program evaluation have increased.52
Of greatest significance is the recent development of actuarial risk assessment tools designed to separate high risk offenders from those unlikely to
commit new crimes in the future." While these instruments are subject to critique, 5 4 the use of statistical information in discussions of crime policy has ofHealth Care Issues, to Richard J. Durbin, Senator, United States Senate 4 (Jan. 15, 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03172r.pdf) Accurate assessment has been also hampered
by poor data collection by criminal justice entities and by the use of disparate coding across agencies and jurisdictions. Id.
49
See DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY
OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES 6-8 (1975).
50
A handful of research organizations, such as the Vera Institute of Justice in New York City
and the Urban Institute in Washington, D.C. have long conducted quality research and published
evaluations of pilot programs funded by publiG and private grants, but until recently routine program evaluation has not been part of the larger culture of the criminal justice system. See Sherman, supranote 47.
5
Professor Faye Taxman was one early leader in advancing an evidence-based approach to
supervision. See, e.g., Faye S. Taxman, Supervision: Exploring the Dimensions of Effectiveness,
66 FED. PROBATION 14, 19 (2002).
The larger body of literature in the field of corrections, addictions, and psychological interventions provides evidence about practices that could be applicable to the field of supervision. These practices could be incorporated into
the field to develop a theoretical model of supervision that contributes to
changes in offender behavior to maximize recidivism reduction.
Id.
52

See, e.g., Resources on Evidence-Based Programs and Practices, BUREAU OF JUSTICE.

ASSISTANCE,

CTR.

FOR

PROGRAM

EVALUATION

AND

PERFORMANCE

MEASUREMENT,

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/evaluation/evidence-based.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (providing extensive listing of public and private resources for obtaining assistance with program development and evaluation).
Cf James L. Johnson et al., 75 FED. PROBATION 16 (2011) (discussing history and signific5
ance of risk assessment tools in context of community supervision).
It is worth observing that the promise of the Evidence-Based Practices movement may be
54
matched by its limits. As is true in medicine, research is often inconclusive or incomplete. Human
behavior is complex, and no program evaluation or risk assessment tool is likely to deliver a formula for eliminating crime or preventing deviant behavior. The history of criminal law is replete
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fered a new talking point in a conversation largely driven by rhetoric. Appeals
to "evidence" have accompanied the passage of early release legislation in a
number of jurisdictions, and suggest that policymakers have begun to value
tools they believe will help them distinguish between prisoners who are dangerous and those who are not. Reliance on "scientific" principles has made the release decision appear less risky and more politically and morally palatable than
it otherwise would be.
Growing awareness of the importance of re-entry and the increasing
availability of information about "what works" are two of the key developments
that have enabled states to devise and pass legislation authorizing early release
from prison. The final development is the concrete assistance offered to the
states by nonprofit research centers, such as the Justice Center of the National
Council of State Governments, 6 traditional liberal advocacy groups like the
American Civil Liberties Union,57 and newly-formed conservative policy
groups, such as the Right on Crime Coalition.
Aware that reform is often impeded by a lack of good information, several organizations have begun offering states concrete assistance in diagnosing
and correcting problems in their sentencing and correctional systems. Leading
with examples of abuses occasioned by "scientific" assertions about who is criminal and how such
criminality might be cured. While science can, and should, ground practice, reformers would be
wise not to place too much confidence in its predictive power. Cf Bernard Harcourt, Risk as a
Proxy for Race, CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 3-4 (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/535-323-bh-race.pdf (recounting instances in which "risk
prediction" has disparately impacted minorities in the criminal justice system); VICTORIA F.
NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN

EUGENICS (2008) (recounting efforts by eugenicists to sterilize prisoners in the 1930s).
5
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-22.5-404(l)(b) (2011) (setting forth parole eligibility
guidelines and noting: "Research demonstrates that actuarial risk assessment tools can predict the
likelihood or risk of reoffense with significantly greater accuracy than professional judgment
alone. Evidence-based correctional practices prioritize the use of actuarial risk assessment tools to
promote public safety. The best outcomes are derived from a combination of empirically based
actuarial tools and clinical judgment"); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 190/10 (2010) (requiring "evidence based programming" in prisons and in supervision and release practices). To support the
proliferation of evidence-based practices, the Justice Department's Office of Justice Programs has
launched an online resource, CrimeSolutions.gov that reviews programs and reports on their effectiveness based on accepted research methods. See http://www.CrimeSolutions.gov (last visited
Nov. 11, 2011).
56

See JUSTICE CTR. OF THE NAT'L COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, http://www.justicecenter.csg.org

(last visited Oct. 20, 2011). The American Bar Association Criminal Justice Sections's newlyinitiated State Policy Implementation Project provides yet another example of such efforts. See
A.B.A.

CRIM.

JUST.

SEC.,

http://www2.americanbar.org/sections/criminaljustice/CR203800/Pages/statepolicyproject.aspx
(last visited Nov. 20, 2011).
5

See SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE: STATES REDUCING INCARCERATION RATES AND COSTS
PROTECTING
COMMUNITIES,
ACLU
(2011),
available
at

WHILE

http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/smartreformispossible.pdf.
58

See RIGHT ON CRIME, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR REFORM, http://www.rightoncrime.com

(last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
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the charge in this effort is the Justice Center of the National Council of State
Governments, whose Justice Reinvestment Initiative has so far provided practical assistance to sixteen states.59 The Center assists states in analyzing data and
identifying responsive policy choices, implementing newly adopted policies,
and evaluating outcomes once implementation has occurred. 60 In addition to
offering individualized assistance, the Center recently teamed with the Pew
Center on the States, the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the Public Welfare Foundation to convene a National Summit on
Justice Reinvestment and Public Safety to develop a list of best practices for
states seeking to reduce reliance on incarceration. 6 1 Both the general and indiviFor a description of the research and recommendations the Center has done in Arizona,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin, see Justice Reinvestment: Work in the States, JUST. CTR. OF THE NAT'L COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS,
http://justicereinvestment.org/states (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). In order to receive assistance from
the Reinvestment Initiative, states must:
establish a small, high-level, interbranch, bicameral, and bipartisan team of
elected and appointed officials to work with the Justice Center's nationally
recognized criminal justice policy experts. These experts then consult with a
broad range of stakeholders in the jurisdiction, which may include prosecutors; public defenders; judges; corrections and law enforcement officials; service providers and community leaders; victims and their advocates; people
who have been incarcerated; and health, housing, human service, education,
and workforce professionals.
2, available at
Gov'Ts
STATE
OF
COUNCIL
THE NAT'L
OF
CTR.
JUST.
http://justicereinvestment.org/files/JRoverview_2010_rev.pdf.
60
Not surprisingly, the Center's work has been more successful in some jurisdictions than in
others. In some jurisdictions, lack of political consensus has prevented the Center's work from
progressing beyond the data analysis stage, while in others, recommendations have been implemented and evaluated as successful. Compare JUST. CTR. OF THE NAT'L COUNCIL OF STATE
5

Gov'Ts, INCREASING PUBLIC SAFETY AND GENERATING SAVINGS: OPTIONS FOR NEVADA
at
available
(2007),
POLICYMAKERS
http://justicereinvestment.org/files/NV%20projected%20growth v6.pdf (setting forth policy options for avoiding projected growth in prison populations), with TONY FABELO ET AL., PROGRESS
REVIEW OF MODERNIZATION PLAN OF BExAR COUNTY COMMUNITY SUPERVISION AND
CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT, JUST. CTR. OF THE NAT'L COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS (2011), available at http://justicereinvestment.org/files/BexarPhasellAssessmentJuly_122011rpt.pdf (offering a
second stage follow-up evaluation of a county's progress in meeting 2009 modernization goals for
more effective management of criminal cases).
61
JUST. CTR. OF THE NAT'L COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS ET AL., THE NATIONAL SUMMIT ON
JUSTICE REINVESTMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY: ADDRESSING RECIDIVISM, CRIME, AND CORRECTIONS
SPENDING (2011), available at http://justicereinvestment.org/summit/report. Out of that summit
came a report identifying four principles essential for jurisdictions wanting to reduce recidivism

and increase public safety through the adoption of evidence-based practices. These included using
risk assessment tools to focus control on individuals leaving prison who are most likely to reoffend; "investing in programs and practices that have a strong foundation in research;" using community supervision policies and practices that attend to the times and places when released persons are most likely to be vulnerable to re-offense; and teaming with police and other agencies to

use "place-based efforts that focus on the sites where crime is high and people under corrections
supervision are concentrated." Id. at 6-7.
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dualized assistance provided by the Justice Center and its partners have been
instrumental in state efforts to craft laws and policies designed to reduce prison
populations.
III. STATE EXPERIMENTATION

The preceding section described how re-entry initiatives and evidencebased practices promulgated by nonprofit organizations provided states with the
resources to reevaluate custodial policies at the same time the financial crisis
was pressuring them to better manage skyrocketing correctional costs. Jurisdictions have responded in many different ways. Some have done nothing.62 Others
have focused their reform efforts on keeping people out of prison by mandating
probation or drug treatment for minor offenses and by expanding opportunities
for treatment and non-custodial penalties for those serving periods of community supervision. Still others have sought more immediate relief by authorizing
early release for certain classes of prisoners. 3
The states that have experimented with early release laws have had
widely differing experiences. Some have obtained significant relief from overcrowding as a result of early release polices, while others have seen little change
in their custodial populations. In some states, prisoners released early have attracted public attention by committing serious crimes; in others, debate about
the safety of early release has been more muted. Despite these differences, most
states that have expanded opportunities for early release have seen the practice
come under fire to some degree. Although the following survey is by no means
comprehensive, it illustrates several states' distinctive experiences with early
release legislation enacted after the year 2000, and highlights similarities and
differences between them in the ways their laws have been received.
A.

Washington and Kansas: Quiet Decline

Like most states, Washington experienced prison growth during the first
decade of the new millennium at an average rate of 2.3 % annually from 2000 to
2008.6 In 2003, it became one of the first states to take purposeful action to
address the size of its prison population by allowing designated prisoners to
reduce their sentences by up to fifty percent by participating in prison programs
62

The Federal Bureau of Prisons has made no efforts to stem the dramatic growth of the federal prison population, which has increased from 24,252 in 1980 to more than 209,500 in 2011. U.S.
DEP'T

OF

JUST.,

ABOUT

THE

FEDERAL

BUREAU

OF

PRISONS

(2011),

available

at

http://www.bop.gov/news/PDFs/ipaabout.pdf.
63
See Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth: Judicial Sentence
Modification as a PromisingMethod of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 465, 485-94
(2010) (cataloguing recent legislation providing for early release).
6

HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, PRISONERS IN 2009 16 (2010), available at

http:/ibjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf.
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(previously, the maximum permitted reduction was thirty-three percent).65 The
new law applied to prisoners convicted of most drug and property offenses
whose risk assessments suggested they were at low risk of recidivism. 66
The law was implemented without incident, and by all reports, achieved
its goals of conserving state money with only a negligible cost to public safety.
A study conducted by the Washington Institute for Public Policy found that the
new law reduced average prison stays by sixty-three days, with few instances of
recidivism. 67 Although the study found that prisoners given early release were
more likely to commit property crimes during the first year following release,
over a subsequent three-year period, early-released prisoners were found to be
3.5 % less likely to commit a violent crime than were similar prisoners who
were not released early. 68 According to the Institute's report, accounting for
both prison-related cost savings and crime-related costs of recidivism, the new
law resulted in significant savings-on average, $7179 per early-released pris-

oner.69
On the surface, Washington's experiment with expanded early release
had all the hallmarks of success: it complied with evidence-based theories by
limiting release to a low-risk group of prisoners, resulted in significant savings,
and did not have an overall negative effect of public safety. Yet despite those
attributes, inaction by the state legislature allowed the law to sunset in July
2010.70 It was not until January 2011 that new legislation was introduced to reenact retroactively the primary provisions of the expanded early release law, and
since that time no further action has been taken.7 1 The state's earned release
laws have now reverted to twenty percent as the maximum sentence reduction
available to prisoners for participation in treatment programs.7 2
Washington's experience with early release has much in common with
Kansas, where policymakers have also found that public tolerance for sentence
reduction credit is qualified. One of the first participants in the Justice Reinvest-

See Wool & Stemen, supra note 1, at 5.
66
WASH. E.S.S.B. 5990 (2003-04); codified at WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9.94A.729(3)(c), (4)
(West 2010) (authorizing anyone convicted before Jul. 1, 2010 who is "not classified as an offender who is at a high risk to reoffend" and who has not been convicted of enumerated violent
felonies to "earn up to fifty percent of aggregate earned release time.").
65

67

LAW

E.K. DRAKE & R. BARNOSKI, INCREASED EARNED RELEASE FROM PRISON: IMPACTS OF A 2003

ON

RECIDIVISM

AND

CRIME

COSTS,

REVISED

(2009),

available

at

http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/09-04-1201.pdf.
68
Id. at 6. To be precise, early-released prisoners had an over-all recidivism rate of forty-one
percent compared to fifty-three percent of the ordinarily-released prisoners.
69
Id.at9.
70

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 9.94A.729(4)

(West 2010) (sunset clause).

See H.B. 1020 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
72
See WASH. DEP'T OF CORR. POLICY No. 350.100 I.C., D. (Oct. 24, 2011), available at
http://www.heraldnet.com/assets/pdf/DH9923 1111 .pdf.
71
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ment Initiative,73 Kansas was seen as an early leader in the move toward reducing
prison populations while safeguarding the public. 74 In 2007, as part of the state's
effort to encourage prisoners to participate in programs designed to prepare them
for later success, the state passed legislation that increased the amount of earned
credit available to lower-level offenders to twenty percent of their sentences. In
part because of the operation of the new law, the state was able to reduce its prison
population by 7.5 %between 2004 and 2009.76
Kansans' tolerance for earned credit was not without limit, however.
When the Kansas Sentencing Commission recently proposed an increase in the
amount of available credit, from twenty to fifty percent, it was met with firm
resistance. 7 7 Although a reduction of twenty percent was perceived as a beneficial incentive for program participation, a "half-off' discount was resisted as an
illegitimate change in the underlying sentence.

73

JUST. CTR. OF THE NAT'L COUNCIL ON STATE Gov'Ts, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT STATE BRIEF:

at

available

KANSAS,

http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/KS%20State%20Brieflpd
74

See, e.g., JUDITH GREENE, POSITIVE TRENDS AND BEST PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

REFORM:

A

NATIONAL

OVERVIEW,

JUSTICE

STRATEGIES

8-9

(2009),

available

at

http://www.justicestrategies.org/sites/default/files/publications/PositiveTrends.pdf
7s

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 21-6821

(West 2011).

[T]he amount of good time which can be earned by an inmate and subtracted
from any sentence is limited to .. . an amount equal to 15% of the prison part
of the sentence [for a crime committed on or after July 1, 1993] or . . . an
amount equal to 20% of the prison part of the sentence [for a drug severity
level 3 or 4 or a nondrug severity level 7 through 10 crime committed on or
after January 1, 2008].
Id.
Roger Werholtz, Secretary of Kansas Department of Corrections, Statement by Secretary
Roger Werholtz Kansas Department of Corrections: hearing on Justice Reinvestment Before the
Appropriations
Subcommittee,
(Apr.
1,
2009),
available
at
http://www.google.com/url?sa-t&rct-j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=OCBwQFjAA&url
=http%3A%2F%2Fjusticereinvestment.org%2Ffiles%2FKansas.Werhotlz.pdf&ei=XfPKTqz2Mqr
s2AWtjoX5Dw&usg=AFQjCNFGUs6br8HAj9Oa8O98NpuaOnG6fw
76

[I]n 2003, we were returning parolees to prison once they were released at a
rate of 55% or more over a five year follow up period. If we were going to
make Kansas safer, this is the area that offered the greatest opportunity. We
made a commitment to improve our agency's level of performance in this area
while not reducing our level of performance along the risk containment dimension.
Id.
n

Joe Lambe, With More Prisoners and No Place to Put Them Kansas Faces Hard Choices,

KAN. CITY STAR (Oct. 10, 2010), available at Westlaw, 2010 WLNR 20219787 (quoting state

prosecutor opposing proposal "to increase 'good time' credit for some inmates from 10 or 20
percent to up to 50 percent, meaning prisoners who stay out of trouble could be released after
serving half of their sentences" on the ground that it "would violate promises the state made to
those who have suffered at the hands of criminals").
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Illinois and New Jersey: An Abrupt Ending

Unlike Washington, where early release died with a whimper, the New
Jersey and Illinois experience with early release ended with a bang.78 In both
states, media attention to crimes committed by beneficiaries of early release
programs led to the rapid shutdown of early release programs.
Unlike many other jurisdictions, New Jersey never embraced truth-insentencing, and until June 1997, most people convicted of felony offenses were
only required to serve one-third of their sentences before reaching discretionary
parole eligibility. 79 While other states were experiencing exponential growth in
their prison populations, New Jersey actually saw a nineteen percent decline
between 1999 to 2009 8 0-a result the state achieved primarily through parole
reform. Beginning in the early 2000s, the state department of parole adopted a
risk assessment tool and increased its parole rates, placing heavy emphasis on
re-entry efforts designed to prevent failure among re-entering parolees.
Wanting to offer prisoners not granted discretionary parole transitional
support similar to that offered to paroled inmates, state lawmakers introduced
legislation that would permit prisoners within six months of release to spend the
last months of their sentences under parole supervision or in a secure halfway
house. 8 2 Outgoing Governor Jon Corzine signed the legislation on his last day in
office,83 and the law took effect on January 3, 2011. Between that date and May
84
9, 2011, almost 400 prisoners were released under the new law's provisions.
78

Cf T.S. ELIOT, The Hollow Men, in SELECTED POEMS 75 (1954).

79
CANDACE MCCOY & PATRICK MCMANIMON, JR., NEW JERSEY'S "No EARLY RELEASE ACT":
ITS IMPACT ON PROSECUTION, SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND VICTIM SATISFACTION 59 (2004),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/203977.pdf. On average, most prisoners
sentenced under these earlier laws secured release after serving one-half of the court-imposed
sentence. Id. New Jersey passed a "No Early Release Act" in 1997 that required some felony
offenders to serve eighty-five percent of their sentences before becoming eligible for discretionary
release, this token truth-in-sentencing law only affected prisoners convicted of serious violent
felonies; in other words, those who were less likely to secure parole under any sentencing regime.
See N.J. Laws Chapter 117 §4 (2007); Thomas Ginsberg, New N.J. Law Callsfor Longer Prison
Terms, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 6, 1997, available at http://articles.philly.com/1997-0606/news/25525923 1_prison-terms-criminals-prison-sentences.
8
MARC MAUER, DOWNSCALING PRISONS: LESSONS FROM FOUR STATES: THE SENTENCING
at
available
(2010),
42
PROJECT
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/incDownscalingPrisons20l0.pdf.
81

Id. at 4.

82

James Osborne, Killings Spark Debate Over New N.J. Early-Release Programfor Inmates,
available at http://articles.philly.com/2011-04Apr.
1, 2011,
PHILA.
INQUIRER,
0 1/news/29370873_Iearly-release-early-release-rearrested.
83
Chris Megerian, New Law Ends Early Release of Prisoners, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, May
10, 2011, at 9, availableat Westlaw, 2011 WLNR 9278986. The press reported controversy over
whether the Governor intended the law to take effect as written, or whether he thought changes
were to be made to the early release provisions. In any event, the law took effect without alteration. Id.
84
Id
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Early returns appeared promising: of the 363 inmates released during
the first quarter of the year, only twenty-two were rearrested during the first few
months following release-the most common window for recidivism. 85 Unfortunately, however, the low re-arrest rate was soon overshadowed by murder
charges against two of the releasees.86 The state's new governor lost no time in
blaming the early release law for the violence, pointedly asking at a press conference, "How many more murders are going to be committed under this rotten
legislation?"8 7 Responding in a broadly bipartisan move, the state legislature
repealed the new law in May 2011.88
Since then, the Governor and other New Jersey lawmakers have backed
away from further efforts to reduce the state's prison population. Commenting
on the lack of support for early release legislation, State Senator Raymond Lesniak observed, "[Lawmakers] don't want to take the political risk. Basically
what they've told me is that any early release, as meritorious as this is, as helpful as this is in preventing recidivism, they don't want to take the risk of anyone
committing murders." 9
Although Illinois's recent experiment with early release did not involve
high profile murders, it too suffered from negative media coverage followed by
swift political retrenchment. In Illinois, the Department of Corrections had long
enjoyed discretionary authority to award "meritorious good time credit"
("MGT") to prisoners to relieve overcrowding. 90 When a new Director of the
State Department of Corrections was appointed in 2009, he decided to expand
the practice of awarding MGT to prisoners transferred to the department with
only weeks or, at most, several months left to serve.91 By custom, the state Department of Corrections had refrained from awarding these short term prisoners
MGT until they had served sixty days in prison. 9 2 The new director decided to
rescind that informal policy, thereby assuring that short termers would be able to

Chris Megerian, NJ. Lawmakers Near Vote to Eliminate Early-Release Prison Program,
N.J.COM
(Apr.
28,
2011),
http:www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/04/nj_1awmakers near vote-on elim.html.
86
Megerian, supra note 83.
87
Osborne, supra note 82.
88
S. 2308, 214th Leg., 2011 Sess. (N.J. 2011).
89
Chris Megerian, N.J. Inmate in Middle of Political Fight over Early Release Program,
at
available
2011,
5,
June
TIMES,
TRENTON
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/06/inmate-in-middle-of fight over.html.
8

90

MALCOLM C. YOUNG,

RELEASE"

FROM

SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE TRUTH ABOUT "EARLY
at
available
(2010),
3
PRISONs

ILLINOIS

http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/files/setting-the-record-straight.pdf.
91
Id. These prisoners had long troubled the department because although they were typically
sent through the required prison intake process and underwent medical, psychological, and educational evaluations at a high cost to the department, they would not remain in custody long enough
to participate in programs or receive non-emergency treatment.
92
Id. at 4.
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return to the community before the department wasted money sending them
through new prisoner assessments.93
Despite the administrative nature of the implemented change, and the
minor effect it had on any given prisoner's duration of confinement, the MGTPush policy (as it was dubbed in the media) came under intense scrutiny when a
journalist from the Associated Press reported on the release of short term inmates under what he characterized as a "secret program" that allowed more than
800 prisoners to avoid any significant term of confinement in prison. 94 Later
news stories reported that the practice was responsible for the early release of
more than 1700 inmates convicted of minor felony offenses.95 In light of this
negative press, the Governor suspended the program in December 2009 and
ordered a review of all early release programs in the state. 96 A short time later,
the state legislature passed a new law requiring adherence to the former custom
of delaying award of any MGT for at least sixty days after a prisoner reports to
the state intake facility. 97
Since MGT was put on hold, the Illinois prison population has hit a
record high, at a record cost.9 8 Although the Department of Corrections reports
93

Id.

94
John O'Connor, Illinois Prisons Shave Terms, Secretly Release Inmates, STATE J. REG.,
Dec. 13, 2009, availableat http://www.sj-r.com/archive/xl479444730/AP-report-Illinois-prisonsshave-terms-secretly-release-inmates.
Records obtained and analyzed by the AP show that since September more
than 850 inmates have been released weeks earlier than they ordinarily would
be. The Corrections Department is saving money by abandoning a policy that
requires inmates to serve at least 61 days and awarding them discretionary
good-conduct credit immediately upon entering prison. That means some
prisoners have enough good-conduct days to qualify for release almost immediately-before they've had a chance to demonstrate any conduct at all, good
or bad. The inmates are kept at the department's prison processing centers and
released after as few as 11 days.
Id. See also John O'Connor, Illinois Ends Secret Prison-ReleasePlan, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 15,
2009, at A15, available at Westlaw, 2009 WLNR 25282518; Press Release, Gov. Quinn Signs
Public
Safety
Initiative
Law
(Jan.
14,
2010),
available
at
http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectlD=1 &RecNum=8174
(describing new law requiring "prisoners in state custody to serve at least 60 days of their sentences before being eligible for meritorious good conduct credit.").
9
Monique Garcia, Gov. Pat Quinn Admits Mistake on Early-Release of Prisoners,Blames
Corrections Chief CHI. TRIB., Dec. 31, 2009, availableat http://articles.chicagotribune.com/200912-3 1/news/chi-quinn-parole-program-3 1dec31_1_1 early-release-major-state-agency-michaelrandle.
96
Monique Garcia, 2nd Early Release Program Suspended, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 2010, available
at http//:articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-01 -06/news/quinn-prison-06_learly-releaserelease-program-michael randle (reporting suspension of early prison release program designed
for nearly 1000 nonviolent offenders).
97
O'Connor, Illinois PrisonsShave Terms, Secretly Release Inmates, supra note 94.
98
Edith Brady-Lunny, Captive to a Rising Budget Illinois Seeks Solution to BallooningPrison
Costs After Axing Meritorious Programs,PANTAGRAPH, Mar. 27, 2011, at Al, available at Wes-
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that it is "continuing [its] analysis and discussions about credit that could be
earned by inmates in the Department of Corrections," almost two years have
passed and no changes appear to be in sight.99
C.

Wisconsin: A ScattershotApproach

In Wisconsin, recent experiments with expanded early release have been
neither disastrous nor successful; more than anything, they illustrate the conflicting impulses that have animated criminal justice policy over the past decade.
Wisconsin was a latecomer to truth-in-sentencing, switching from an indeterminate to a determinate sentencing framework on the eve of the millennium. 00
Initially, the state's new truth-in-sentencing system was one of the harshest in
the nation, requiring prisoners to serve one hundred percent of their sentences,
with no reduction for good time or opportunity for any other sentence reduction
credit.o0 Although "parole" was abolished in 2000, all felony sentences included a mandatory term of "extended supervision" at the end of the custodial
sentence. 102
Recognizing the harshness of the new laws and concerned over projected growth in the prison population, in 2003, minor alterations to the state's
sentencing laws allowed some prisoners convicted of lower-level felonies to
petition their sentencing courts for a fifteen to twenty-five percent reduction in
sentence. 10 3 However, outside of that petition power and a few other, specialized
common law and statutory mechanisms for sentence reduction,3 '4 Wisconsin
prisoners whose crimes were committed from 2000 onward were ineligible for any
routine form of early release.

tlaw, 2011 WLNR 7636579 ("Illinois ... faces serious challenges with its prisons' budget and
population, which clocked a record 48,789 inmates in February. The higher census follows a trend
that started in January 2010 after Gov. Pat Quinn halted the Meritorious Good Time (MGT) and
MGT-Push programs."). Id.
99
Id. (quoting Cara Smith, Chief of Staff for the Department of Corrections).
100
1997 Wis. ACT 283 (creating a truth-in-sentencing system to take effect on Dec. 31, 1999).
101 See Jesse J. Norris, The Early Release Revolution: Early Assessments and State-Level Stratat
available
2012),
REv.
(forthcoming
L.
MARQ.
egies,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1909648.
102
See WIs. STAT. § 973.01 (2001).
103
See Wis. STAT. § 973.195 (2003); Thomas J. Hammer, The Long and Arduous Journey to
Truth-In-Sentencing in Wisconsin, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 15 (2002); John A. Birdsall & Raymond
M. Dall'Osto, Fully Implementing Truth-in-Sentencing: Problems with the New Truth-inat
available
(2002)
LAWYER
75
Wis.
Law,
Sentencing
http://www.wisbar.org/am/template.cfm?section=wisconsin-lawyer&template=/cm/contentdispla
y.cfin&contentid=50151.
104
See Klingele, supra note 63, at 506-09 (describing Wisconsin's common law of judicial
sentence modification).
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Despite the 2003 changes to truth-in-sentencing, the state's prison population continued to grow.'os Concerned over the rate of growth, the state sought
assistance from the Justice Reinvestment Initiative. The Justice Center's study
revealed that much of the state's prison growth was driven by the revocations
from lengthy terms of extended supervision: in 2007, fifty-five percent of state
prisoners were in custody because they had been revoked from community supervision.10 6 The Justice Center recommended a set of changes to law and practice, only one of which related to early release. With sensitivity toward the
state's preference for judicial decisionmaking, the Center recommended the
creation of a "risk reduction" sentence that would "[p]rovide the court with a
sentencing option that creates an incentive for an offender to complete programs
prior to release while adhering to the principles of Wisconsin's truth-insentencing system."lo7
Instead of implementing the recommended changes as part of a larger
effort to tackle the problem of growing custodial populations, the Governor instead inserted a group of disparate early release provisions into the biennial
budget bill.'0o The proposed legislation included the risk-reduction sentencing
option proposed by the Justice Center, but it did not provide for use of a risk
assessment tool at sentencing or funding that would enable the Department of
Corrections to expand its treatment programs to absorb eligible prisoners. 1 09 I
addition to the risk-reduction sentence, the budget bill resurrected good time (re105

From 2000 to 2007, the population increased from approximately 19,800 to 22,300 adult

prisoners. Compare DEP'T OF CORR., OFFENDERS UNDER CONTROL ON JANUARY 7, 2000, available

at http://www.wi-doc.com/Documents/statistics/fri_01_07_2000.pdf, with DEP'T OF CORR.,
OFFENDERS UNDER CONTROL ON DECEMBER 28, 2007, available at http://www.widoc.com/Documents/statistics/fri_12 28 2007.pdf.
106
JUST. CTR. OF THE NAT'L COUNCIL ON STATE Gov'TS, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT IN WISCONSIN:
ANALYSES & POLICY OPTIONS To REDUCE SPENDING ON CORRECTIONS AND INCREASE PUBLIC

SAFETY

(2009),

http://justicereinvestment.org/files/WisconsinAnalyses
107
Id. at 9.
1os
2009 Wis. ACT 28.
109
WIS. STAT. § 973.031 (2009).

available

at

andPolicyOptions.pdf.

Whenever a court imposes a sentence for a felony [except in the case of enumerated restricted crimes] the court may order the person it sentences to serve
a risk reduction sentence if the court determines that a risk reduction sentence
is appropriate and the person agrees to cooperate in an assessment of his or
her criminogenic factors and his or her risk of reoffending, and to participate
in programming or treatment the department develops for the person.
Id.; Wis. STAT. §302.042 (2009) (requiring the Department of Corrections to conduct a risk assessment and to create an individualized program plan for all prisoners given a risk reduction
sentence by the court, and requiring the Department to release such a prisoner in the following
circumstance: "when he or she serves not less than 75 percent of the term of confinement portion
of his or her sentence . . . and the department determines that he or she has completed the programming or treatment under his or her plan and that the inmate maintained a good conduct record
during his or her term of confinement").
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framed as "positive adjustment time"),1 0 reinstated discretionary parole (under
the title "earned release") for prisoners convicted of many minor felonies,"'
expanded opportunities for parole of the elderly, infirm, and disabled,"l 2 and
gave prison officials discretion to release certain categories of prisoners up to

one year early.113
The proposed legislation split release decisionmaking authority between
multiple actors. Most of the proposed laws allowed the resurrected parole board
to decide whether to release a prisoner, but then authorized judicial veto of any
release decision. 114 Some vested discretion entirely in the parole board, while
still others gave prison officials responsibility for determining the propriety of

110 The proposed new laws created three levels at which good time credit could be earned,
based upon a prisoner's felony offense classification. See Norris, supra note 101, at 18; Wis.
STAT. § 302.113(2)(b) (2009); Wis. STAT. § 304.06(1)(bg)(1) (2009); WIs. STAT. § 304.06(l)(bg)(2)
(2009).
Wis. STAT. § 304.06(l)(bg)(3) (2009).
"
A person sentenced . . . for a misdemeanor or for a Class F to Class I felony
committed prior to October 1, 2009, and who has not petitioned a sentencing
court for a sentence adjustment ... may apply for release to extended supervision when he or she has served at least 75 percent of the term of confinement
portion of his or her bifurcated sentence.
Id.
112

Wis. STAT. § 302.1135 (2009).
An inmate .

.

. may seek modification of the bifurcated sentence .

.

. if ...

[t]he inmate is 65 years of age or older and has served at least 5 years of the
term of confinement in prison ... or has served at least 5 years in prison for a
life sentence . .

.[;]

is 60 years of age or older and has served at least 10 years

of the term of confinement in prison .. . or has served at least 10 years in prison for a life sentence . . . [and] [t]he inmate has an extraordinary health condition.
Id. § 302.1135(2)(a)-(b). The statute defines an extraordinary health condition as "a condition
afflicting a person, such as advanced age, infirmity, or disability of the person or a need for medical treatment or services not available within a correctional institution." Id. § 302.1135(1).
113
Wis. STAT. § 302.113(9h)(c) (2009).
A person .. . is eligible for sentence modification ... if. . . [he] is serving the
confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence for a misdemeanor or a Class F
to Class I felony that is not a violent offense . . . [t]he prison social worker or
extended supervision agent of record has reason to believe that the person will
be able to maintain himself or herself while not confined without engaging in
assaultive activity [and] [t]he release . . . is not more than 12 months before
the persons extended supervision eligibility date.

Id
114
See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 302.113(7m)(c) (2009) (giving judges discretionary review over
award of sentence credit); Wis. STAT. § 304.06(4)(bk) (2009) (same).
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release.' Although the provisions overlapped considerably and were sometimes inconsistent, all were enacted.
When the laws were first introduced, the state Department of Corrections predicted they would result in savings of $30 million in prison-related expenditures.116 In the first two years of the legislation, 608 prisoners were released under all of the new early release mechanisms combined, a meager number when compared to the 17,400 prisoners who ordinarily exit the Wisconsin
prison system in any given 24-month period.' 17 By May 2010, early release
measures had saved approximately $900,000-not an insignificant amount, but
far less than predicted.' 18 While the state did see a decrease in its custodial population, only 12 percent of that reduction was attributable to the operation of the
new laws.' 19 Meanwhile, opponents pointed to the disappointing savings as evidence that the new laws were ill-conceived.120
Despite its small scale and negligible effects on public safety, opposition to the practice of early release mounted. Critics decried the law as dangerous and inconsistent with the state's stringent adherence to the idea of truth-insentencing.121 In the summer of 2011, with the support of the state's newly-

"15
Compare Wis. STAT. § 302.113 (giving the ERRC complete discretion to decide whether to
release inmates with extraordinary health conditions), with Wis. STAT. § 302.113(9h) (allowing
prison officials to decide whether to award early release during the last year of a sentence).
116
Ben Poston, 3 Back Behind Bars After Early-Release Reforms, MIL. J. SENTINEL, Aug. 18,
2010, available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/101039484.html.
117
Paul Fanlund, Prison Policy: A Bonanza for GOP Demagogues, CAP. TIMES 5 (July
27,
2011), available at Westlaw, 2011 WLNR 14894355 (reporting statistics produced by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections). The Department of Corrections defended its timid approach to
implementation, explaining, "[W]e have been incredibly careful and thoughtful about the individuals
that the secretary approves for release. Our goal is to do this in a safe manner, and that's the premise
we use to review all these cases." Ben Poston, State Sentencing Reforms Result in 158 Early Prison
2010,
available
at
J.
SENTINEL,
July
9,
Releases,
MIL.
http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/98154099.html.
118
Notably, within that same time period, relatively few of those released early were returned
to prison, and all returns involved minor infractions. Poston, supranote 117.
119
See Norris, supra note 101, at 67. The Department of Corrections attributed the majority of
the decrease in prison population to improvements in recidivism rates for former prisoners. Dee J.
Hall, State's Big PrisonPopulation Drop Called "Historic",WIs. STATE J., Jan. 13, 2011, available at http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/crime-andcourts/article a351792c-le97-11eOba47-00lcc4c002e0.html.
120
Reacting to news that three early-release prisoners had been re-incarcerated, Republican
Scott Suder, a critic of the legislation, asserted, "I think there are going to be more. I suspect that's
why (the Corrections Department) is being overly cautious. In reality, they are not releasing that
many people. As a result, they have not achieved the savings they said they would." Id.
121
See, e.g., Jennifer K. Woldt, Bill Would End Early Release, OSHKOSH Nw., May 16, 2011,
available at Westlaw, 2011 WLNR 9809854 ("[O]pponents of the bill said the process of determining which prisoners are released is flawed because it takes place behind closed doors, without
any input from the sentencing judges, district attorneys, law enforcement or victims involved in
the case.").
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elected governor, nearly all of the early release provisions passed in 2009 were

repealed.1 22
D.

California:An UncertainFuture

Of all states confronting budgetary pressures and rising prison costs,
California has been hardest hit. California confines the highest number of state
prisoners in the country, more than Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island combined.12 3 As early as 1990, California's problems of severe overcrowding, insufficient mental and medical
health facilities, and above-average prisoner suicide rates prompted class action
litigation in the federal courts.' 2 4 After finding that conditions in the state prison
system were so poor they violated the Eighth Amendment, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California placed the prison health
care system into federal receivership in 2006.125 When even that failed to spur
the State to correct constitutionally inadequate conditions, in 2010 a three-judge
court ordered the state to reduce its prisoner population by 40,000 within three
years' time.126 The Supreme Court affirmed that decision in June 2011. 127
California has already taken a number of measures to reduce its custodial population, including shortening the amount of time prisoners spend under
correctional supervision following release, expanding opportunities for discretionary parole, increasing the parole rate for eligible prisoners, creating new
opportunities for prisoners to earn sentence reduction credit through participation in programming and community service work,12 8 and authorizing the early
release of jail inmates.' 29 These changes, many of which preceded the Supreme
Court's final ruling in the Plata case, resulted in modest but measurable reduc122

2011 Wis. ACT 38.

123

WEST & SABOL, supra note

64, at 16.
See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, CO1-1351 TEH, 2010
WL 99000 at *23 (E.D., N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (three judge panel Order to Reduce Prison Population).
125
See Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 560 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2009).
126
Coleman, 2010 WL 99000, at *21.
127
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
124

128

ALISON LAWRENCE, CUTTrNG CORRECTIONS COSTS: EARNED TIME POLICIES FOR STATE

(2009),
available
at
OF
STATE
LEGIS.
1
NAT'L
CONF.
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/cj/Earned-time report.pdf ("California ... laws reward
inmates who are trained to work in disaster relief or on conservation projects. Sentence credits for
these programs are greater than for ordinary prison work, education or training. In California, an
inmate earns two days' credit for every one day of such service.").
129
Randal C. Archibold, California, in Financial Crisis, Opens Prison Doors, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/us/24calprisons.html. But see
Patrick McGreevy, CaliforniaLawmakers Act to Repeal Early-Release Law, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30,
2010, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/30/localla-me-jails-20100430 (describing
decision to repeal law providing for early release from jail).
PRISONERS,
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tions in the state's prison population from a 2006 high of 175,512,130 to 169,413
at the beginning of 2010.131
The state's most dramatic change has just begun. Beginning in October
2011, under the new Criminal Justice Alignment Act, responsibility transferred
from the state to the counties for managing all felony offenders convicted of
nonviolent, nonsexual offenses.1 32 In signing the new legislation, Governor Edmund Brown stated:
California's correctional system has to change, and this bill is a
bold move in the right direction. For too long, the State's prison
system has been a revolving door for lower level offenders and
parole violators who are released within months--often before
they are even transferred out of a reception center. Cycling
these offenders through state prisons wastes money, aggravates
crowded conditions, thwarts rehabilitation, and impedes local
law enforcement supervision. Under this bill, the State will continue to incarcerate offenders who commit serious, violent, or
sexual crimes; but counties will supervise, imprison, and rehabilitate lower level offenders.' 33
By transferring thousands of prisoners to the counties, the new state policy signals a shift in strategy by the administration, accomplishing the immediate goal
of reducing the number of people in state prisons, as required by the federal
courts, while absolving state lawmakers of responsibility for ordering the early
release of any prisoners.13 4
Under the new law, counties will receive limited financial assistance
from the state and will decide independently how best to allocate those resources, whether by strengthening community-based sanctions or building additional jail cells.135 To make space for felony offenders, counties are expected to
130

See WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., PRISONERS IN 2006, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 2 (2007), availa-

ble at http:/ibjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p06.pdf

131
FIRST

PEW CTR. FOR THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010: STATE POPULATION DECLINES FOR THE

TIME

IN

38

YEARS

7

(2010),

available

at

http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/PrisonCount_2010.pdf?n=880.
132
See Assemb. B. 109, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011); Assemb. B. 117, 2011 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2011).
133 Signing Statement of Gov.
Edmund Brown (Apr. 5, 2011), available at
http://gov.ca.gov/docs/AB_109_Signing Message.pdf.
134
Although state lawmakers reticence to take more decisive action is understandable in light
of the backlash other states (and California itself) have had with early release programs, it stands
at odds with Californians general support of such measures. CaliforniansLooking for Answers,
L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2011, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/opinionla/la-edpolls-201 1073 1,0,24256.story (reporting that in recent poll "more Californians favor early release
for perpetrators of low-level crimes rather than spending more money on prisons").
13

See generally A.B. 109, 2011 Cal. Stat. Ch. 15. See also COMMUNITY SAFETY,
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release many individuals now confined in jail awaiting trial or sentence, or serving a short misdemeanor sentence. The choice of who to release early will now
rest with county sheriffs rather than judges or the state parole board. By shifting
release decisions to the counties, California is gambling that local solutions will
be more successful than its own failed state-level attempts to solve the problem.
Whether that is so remains to be seen.
IV. EVALUATING EARLY RESULTS

The "renaissance" of early release is too new to permit more than a tentative assessment of the functioning of such laws across the nation. With that
caveat, however, a preliminary assessment of recent state experimentation is
warranted in light of states' continuing efforts to manage prison populations
through early release measures.
A.

Measuring Success

To deliver even an initial evaluation of early release efforts, it is first
necessary to consider what "success" or "failure" might mean in the early release context. In every jurisdiction where early release legislation has been
enacted, supporters have hoped that the laws will improve the state of criminal
justice, usually by reducing prison-associated costs, alleviating overcrowding,
and assisting prisoners' transition from custody to the community. To stand any
chance of achieving those goals, laws must first surmount two fundamental obstacles: they must avoid repeal and they must be utilized by those responsible
for their implementation. Early release legislation has often failed on both
fronts.
The most rudimentary prerequisite to success is a law's persistence; that
is, whether it has enough political and public support to withstand repeal. While
persistence alone does not guarantee success, a law cannot achieve its goals if it
does not last long enough to be fully implemented. Three of the states profiled
above-Illinois, New Jersey, and Wisconsin-have seen their early release laws
repealed or significantly scaled back as a result of various public forms of high
profile political pressure.136 In Washington, expanded earned release legislation
also failed, albeit with less fanfare.' 37 Other states' experiments with early release have had a similarly short lifespan. 38
COMMUNITY

SOLUTIONS,

ACLU

OF

N.

CAL.

(2011),

available

at

http://www.aclunc.org/issues/criminaljustice/assetupload-file464_10365.pdf (primer on realignment, its history, and possible avenues for its implementation).
136 See supra Parts III.B.-D.
137
See supra Part III.A.
13 In 2009, Oregon passed a law that allowed prisoners to reduce their sentences up to 30%
through earned time credits. See OR. REV. STAT. § 421.121(2)(a) (West 2011) (amended by 2010
Or. Laws 1st Sp. Sess. Ch. 2 (S.B. 1007) (West)). Between the time it took full effect in the fall of
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Even where laws have not been repealed or allowed to expire, their success remains contingent on whether they are fully implemented. It is true that in
some cases, the mere persistence of early release laws will guarantee their implementation. Laws that permit prisoners to accrue good time or earned release
credits automatically or upon completion of designated programs, for example,
require no action on the part of prison administrators to take effect: good time
accrues absent behavior on the part of the prisoner that forfeits the credit.13 9
Many early release provisions, however, require judges, prison officials, or parole boards to play an active role in granting early release.140
Laws that require individualized decisions about whom to release and
when have many advantages: they are more attuned to the risks posed by individual prisoners and allow decisionmakers to account for unique facts and circumstances that may bear on public safety or on the fairness of the original sentence in a particular case. The challenge of these laws is that they run the risk of
being underutilized. Laws that expand discretionary parole eligibility do nothing
on their own; in order to deliver their promised benefits, they require paroling
officials to use their new legal authority to grant release to persons within the
expanded class of eligible applicants. Similarly, early release laws that permit
the release of the elderly or infirm can only achieve their desired aims if they are
actually utilized by those authorized to approve prisoners' release.14 1 In these
2009 and February 2010, the law enabled the state department of corrections to save more than $4
million by reducing the sentences of 3523 prisoners by an average of 55 days. See Alan Gustafson, Early-release Law Creates Anxiety, STATESMAN J., Oct. 4, 2009, at Al, available at
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/statesmanjournal/results.html?st-basic&QryTxt-%20earlyrelease%201aw/o2ocreates%20anxiety (describing implementation process). Nevertheless, general
support was overshadowed by coordinated opposition by victim advocacy groups who undertook
a high profile, statewide radio ad campaign. Alan Gustafson, Early-Release Law Fuels Heated
available
at
Feb.
5,
2010,
at
Al,
Debate,
STATESMAN
J.,
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/statesmanjoumal/access/1955645181.html?FMT=ABS&date=Feb+0
5%2C+2010. In response, mere months after the new law took effect, the state legislature suspended its operation through the remainder of 2010. Susan Goldsmith, Oregon Prison Terms: No
Skimping, THE OREGONIAN, Feb. 13, 2010, available at Westlaw, 2010 WLNR 3134966. Although the law was permitted to operate in a reduced form in 2011 and 2012, it is currently scheduled to sunset in 2013.
139
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b); ALASKA STAT. § 33.20.010 (2007) ("a prisoner ... sentenced
to a term of imprisonment that exceeds three days is entitled to a deduction of one-third of the
term of imprisonment rounded off to the nearest day if the prisoner follows the rules of the correctional facility"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.275 (1997) ("As a means of encouraging satisfactory
behavior, the department shall grant basic gain-time at the rate of 10 days for each month of each
sentence imposed on a prisoner. . . .").
140
See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17-22.5-303(6) (2008) (authorizing discretionary parole); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11 70(e)(1) (2011) (providing for discretionary medical parole for certain seriously ill prisoners); WIS. STAT. § 973.195 (2011) (authorizing discretionary judicial release for certain categories of prisoners).
141
As of 2008, at least 35 states authorize prison officials or judges to release prisoners who are
seriously or terminally ill, and many also authorize discretionary release for prisoners suffering
from serious chronic ailments, disability, or the effects of old age. Marty Roney, 36 States Offer
Release to Ill or Dying Inmates, USA TODAY, Aug. 14, 2008, at 4A. These laws have broad-based
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discretionary contexts, the success of early release legislation can be measured
at its most basic level by the number of people released. In many cases, that
number is few.
Fear of public or political backlash can paralyze decisionmakers, rendering them so risk-averse that they refuse to utilize the legal authority they
have been afforded. 142 Wisconsin's abundant new mechanisms for early releasel 43 potentially applied to thousands of prisoners, yet fear of the political
ramifications of a release-gone-bad prevented the Department of Corrections or
the reconstituted parole board from granting relief to more than a fraction of
those eligible.'" Consequently, of the roughly 18,000 people released between
public support and have the potential to save considerable amounts of money, since the states
cannot access federal funds to offset the cost of providing medical services to those confined in
state institutions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (a)(28)(A) (2006) (barring Medicaid payments on behalf
of inmates of public institutions). Nevertheless, the story of compassionate release has been one of
unrealized potential. A 2010 study by the Vera Institute of Justice found that Maryland and Oklahoma had never released a prisoner under their geriatric release provisions; Colorado had released
three prisoners in seven years; Oregon averaged about two releases annually; Virginia had released four prisoners in six years, and so on. TINA CHIU, IT'S ABOUT TIME: AGING PRISONERS,
at
RELEASE
6
(2010),
available
COSTS,
AND
GERIATRIC
INCREASING
http://www.vera.org/download?file=2973/its-about-time-aging-prisoners-increasing-costs-andgeriatric-release.pdf. The largest number of state releases occurred in Missouri, which released
236 elderly and ill prisoners over the course of a decade, and New Mexico, which released 35
prisoners under compassionate release provisions over roughly the same period. Id. at 6, 8. The
low numbers can be explained by bureaucratic delays and complicated procedural hurdles that
often make compassionate release inaccessible to the very prisoners it is designed to assist, as well
as legitimate concerns about releasing ill inmates who may have no other source of care. See, e.g.,
Cara Buckley, Law Has Little Impact on CompassionateReleasefor Ailing Inmates, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2010, at A17.
142

JUST. POL'Y INST., FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: HOW TO SAFELY REDUCE PRISON POPULATIONS

SUPPORT PEOPLE RETURNING TO THEIR COMMUNITIES
1 (2010), available at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/10-06_FACForlmmediateReleasePS-AC.pdf.
Parole boards often face public scrutiny if someone they release commits a
new offense. To avoid public backlash, some parole boards may be overlyconservative in deciding whether to release someone to communitysupervision, keeping imprisoned many people who have served considerable
time, are low-risk for recidivating, and might benefit more from communitybased supervision and support.
Id.
143
See supra Part III.C., Cf Wis. STAT. § 304.06(1)(bg)(3) (2009) (authorizing most prisoners
to petition the Earned Release Review Commission for release after serving seventy-five to eighty-five percent of their sentences, depending on the felony classification of the crime of conviction); Wis. STAT. § 302.113(9g) (2009) (expanding opportunities for compassionate release to
those suffering from any extraordinary health condition); Wis. STAT. §§ 302.113(2)(b),
304.06(1)(bg)(1), (2) (2009) (authorizing positive adjustment credit of up to 33 percent for prisoners serving various gradations of felony); Wis. STAT. §§ 973.031, 302.042 (2009) (authorizing 25
percent sentence reduction for prisoners awarded a "risk reduction sentence" who complete designated prison programs); Wis. STAT. § 302.113 (9h)(c)(3) (2009) (permitting prison officials to
release certain categories of prisoners up to one year before sentence expiration).
144
See Poston,supra note 118.
AND
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the time the Act took effect in Fall 2009 and July 2011, less than half of one percent left prison as a result of the implementation of the new laws.145
The problem is not limited to Wisconsin. A recent study found that Oklahoma would save $9.7 million in one year if the parole board would increase
its rate of release from 13 percent to 20 percent annually. 146 Similarly, in Rhode
Island, "a raft of new early release opportunities" was predicted to dramatically
reduce the state prison population and save millions of dollars. 147 But while
legislators expected a reduction of 211 inmates, only a fraction of that number
were actually released as a result of the new laws.148
Given the very public criticism of early release decisions in Illinois and
New Jersey, it is easy to understand why decisionmakers might be hesitant to
exercise their discretionary authority, absent some sense that the decisions they
make will be shielded from public criticism. Mississippi made strides forward
on this front when it implemented risk assessments for all parole-eligible prisoners. By offering an "evidence-based" instrument on which parole officials
could rely (and which they could blame, if things went wrong), the state was
able to expand access to parole 49 while increasing the parole rate to 50 percent. 5 0 Between April 2009 and August 2009, the parole board released 3100
inmates early, with almost no public controversy, 5' for an estimated savings of
145
146

See Fanlund,supra note 117.
A study by the Northpointe Institute for Public Management found that the Oklahoma

Pardon and Parole Board approves about 13 percent of inmates seeking parole. But taking into account the governor's grant rate, the rate of approved
parole drops to 11 percent ....
If the parole rate were upped to 20 percent approval, the cost savings would
be about $9.7 million the first year, the study states. If it jumped to 60 percent
approved for parole, the savings would be about $53 million the first year, the
study found.
Ginnie Graham, Study: Oklahoma's Low Parole Rate Costing Taxpayers, TULSA WORLD, Mar.
24,
2011,
available
at
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=1 I &articleid=20110324_11_AlCUTLI
N554737.
147
Katherine Gregg, The Worst of Both Worlds Drive Deficit, PROVIDENCE J. BULLETIN, Nov.
18,

2008,

available

at

http://www.projo.com/news/content/quarterlyreportI 1-18-

08_LMCAKQJ v27.3e2d884.html.
148
Id
149
See MIss. CODE ANN. § 47-7-3 (2001); Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-7-3 (2008); John
Buntin,
Mississippi's Corrections Reform: How America's Reddest State-And Most Notorious PrisonBecame
a
Model
of
Corrections
Reform,
GOVERNING
(Aug.
2010),
http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/courts-corrections/mississippi-correctionreform.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
15o
Compare JFA INST. & Miss. DEP'T OF CORR., REFORMING MISSISSIPPI'S PRISON SYSTEM 4
(2009),
available
at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/initiatives-detail.aspx?initiativelD=56957

(reporting a post-

TIS parole rate of 26% for men and 32% for women), with Buntin, supra note 149.
1s1
JFA INST. & Miss. DEP'T OF CORR., supra note 150, at 4.
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approximately $200 million.152 Without a means of political insulation, whether
from the use of risk assessment instruments or from the support of other governmental actors or agencies, decisionmakers are likely to exercise their release
power stingily, thereby limiting the ability of early release laws to achieve their
stated ends.
But even when early release laws persist and the authority they confer is
exercised regularly, declaring laws "successful" is complicated by the everchanging political landscape in which early release laws operate. Kansas has
been a much-touted national example of success, but recent budget pressures
forced the state to back away from many of the investments in communitybased treatment programs that led to the success of its prison-reduction programs.' 53 In short order, those cuts, along with other factors, have reversed the
trajectory of Kansas prison populations, which have again exceeded capacity
and promise to keep growing.154
Washington's early release program also appeared successful, saving
the state money while maintaining public safety.1" Nonetheless, it was allowed
to quietly fade away. Mississippi appears to be an exception to this rule, although there is reason to wonder whether its generous parole policies can be
sustained over time.15 6 As these examples show, even when early release laws
152

Id. at 5.

'5
Rick Montgomery, Kansas' Model ParoleProgramCollapses with State Budget Cuts, KAN.
CITY STAR (Apr. 4, 2010), available at Westlaw, 2010 WLNR 6974039.

Treatment and support services for . . . inmates re-entering society cost $12.6
million two years ago. That was when mental health care, job training and
community residential programs for people on parole helped make Kansas a
national model for success. Now the model has been dismantled. For the fiscal
year beginning July, the corrections department will get about $5.3 million to
fund those programs under Gov. Mark Parkinson's budget recommendations.
To the taxpayer and government officials desperately trying to balance the
state's books, the short-term savings are hard to resist.
Id.
See Lambe, supra note 77. ("A few years ago, Kansas had figured out how to control its
prison population. It had solved the equation and become a national model. No more. Kansas is
officially out of beds for male prisoners, with a population last week of 8,41 1-above the system's
capacity of 8,259. In 10 years, the state is projected to be nearly 2,000 beds short.").
'5
See DRAKE & BARNOSKI, supra note 67.
156 Not all "on the ground" accounts of parole in Mississippi are positive. After a prisoner convicted of homicide and sentenced to 20 years' incarceration was released after serving just 8 years,
the Director of the Gulf Coast Women's Center for Nonviolence noted her opposition to the
state's expansive parole policies:
It's a travesty of justice, and it's caused a ripple effect among other survivors.
They hear the judge give out the sentences, and to know that's not to be
creates fear and anxiety. It's been a very difficult time. We see a need to revise the statutes and the regulations of the Mississippi Department of Corrections so violent criminals aren't put back on the streets. It's like a revolving
door. It happens all the time.
154
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succeed in reducing prison populations and the associated costs of confinement,
their long term success is not guaranteed. The question is why that is so.
B.

Explaining Failure

Despite the demise of early release experiments in states like New Jersey, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Washington, states across the nation continue to
debate the merits of laws that enable prisoners to leave custody sooner. California is just beginning its experiments with locally-controlled early release and,
the Ohio legislature recently passed a law that will increase the availability of
earned release credits.'17 It is in large part because of states' continued interest
that it makes sense to consider more systematically possible explanations for the
failure of early release laws in the states profiled above. The causes for failure
can be grouped into three primary categories: practical obstacles, political timidity, and moral objections.
One simple explanation for the failure of early release laws to pass the
test of time is a lack of adequate re-entry resources. Given that resource constraints are one of the driving forces behind states' willingness to adopt early
release legislation, it should come as no surprise that resource constraints also
serve as a check on the ability of early release mechanisms to remain sustainable.
Moreover, as the New Jersey and Illinois examples demonstrate, support
for early release is highly contingent on the public's confidence that people released from prison early will not commit serious new offenses during the period
of early release.
Yet, by the very fact of past conviction, all released prisoners have already demonstrated a greater-than-average willingness to violate the law, and
consequently pose some potential threat of re-offense." To reduce the risk of
re-offense, states need to provide re-entry support through social, vocational,
educational, and therapeutic programs. These programs, however, require significant investment from the state.
Justice Reinvestment is premised on the notion that, in the long run, reducing reliance on prison will free resources for "reinvestment" in community
programs that, again in the long run, will be less expensive to operate and that
will result in stronger and safer communities.15 9 The problem is that accruing
Margaret Baker & Geoff Pender, Victims Fear Early Release for More Violent Offenders, BILOXI
SUN HERALD (Mar. 27, 2011), availableat Westlaw, 2011 WLNR 5924710.
15
See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2967.193 (West 2011) (expanding early release credits).
158
When recidivism rates run higher than fifty percent, see AUSTIN ET AL., supra, note 29, it is
hardly surprising that many individuals released early will-like their later-released counterparts-commit new criminal offenses.
'
See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2967.19 (West 2011) (allowing prison officials to petition
court for sentence reduction for prisoners who have served eighty percent or more of their sentences).
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these savings and channeling them toward their intended purposereinvestment-takes time.160 Meanwhile, prisoners who are released are likely to
find that community correctional agencies are under-resourced and ill-prepared
to help them navigate the challenges of re-entry. Moreover, there is good reason
to question whether funds captured through reinvestment will ever reach their
intended destination. As Michael Tonry recently observed, "[T]he justice reinvestment strategy assumes that policy makers will be willing to transfer a large
part of the savings to community corrections programs and services. In economic hard times, policy makers are more likely to use newly available money to
fund K-8 schools, higher education, or Medicare."l61 Without the resources
needed to succeed, many released prisoners are likely to fail, fueling public concern about the laws that resulted in their release.
The recent growth of the Kansas prison population provides an example
of this problem. In 2007, the state was heralded as a model of reform. Its recidivism rates were declining, along with its prison population.16 2 Soon afterward,
however, the state cut funding to community-based programming and the department of corrections began to experience a predictable increase in revocations from community supervision. Probation revocations increased by 17.4
percent in 2010, and following five consecutive years of decline, the overall
prison population increased by 13 percent.16 3 Expressing dismay at the speed
with which a model program could unravel, Kansas State Representative Pat
Colloton lamented:
Just like that-the national model we created no longer exists.
We were written up in The Wall Street Journal.I was invited to
the White House . . . The fact that our programs had gotten it

right-and we had the data to prove it-didn't keep us from destroying that model. 16
Constraints upon resources have limited the potential success of early
release measures in other states, too. Wisconsin's failure to fund its riskreduction sentence provides another example. Because the state legislature did
not authorize funds to increase prison program capacity when it authorized its
new "risk-reduction" sentencing option, prisoners made eligible for early release

Michael Tonry, Making Peace, Not a Desert: Penal Reform Should Be About Values Not
Justice Reinvestment, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 637, 637 (2011).
161
Id. at 641.
162
See Werholtz, supra note 75.
160

163

KAN. SENTENCING COMM'N., FISCAL YEAR

2011 ADULT INMATE PRISON POPULATION
at
available
(2010),
1-2
http://www.accesskansas.org/ksc/documents/FY2011_PrisonPopulationProjectionReport.pdf.
164 Montgomery, supra note 153.
PROJECTIONS
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upon program completion stood no chance of actually securing release. (In fact,
not a single eligible prisoner was ever released under the law's provisions.)16 5
The lesson to be gleaned from the Kansas and Wisconsin experience is
that unless states allocate the resources needed to develop strong communitybased alternatives to incarceration at both the front and back ends of the criminal justice system, imprisonment is likely to remain the default preference of
judges, legislators, and the public, and early release laws, however wellconceived, are likely to fail.
Even more challenging than resources constraints are the political impediments to the practice of early release. It is true that the re-birth of early release laws provides a refreshing change from the "lock 'em up" rhetoric that has
dominated sentencing and correctional policy for the past three decades, and the
willingness of traditionally conservative states such as Mississippi and Texas 66
to re-examine the need for mass incarceration provides some evidence of bipartisan agreement that unmitigated use of imprisonment is undesirable. But despite these developments, there is good reason to wonder how deep the commitment to reform runs. The experience of New Jersey, Illinois, and Wisconsin
suggests that political foes are quick to point fingers and appeal to public fear
when new crimes are committed by early-released prisoners.16 7 In a world
where one crime can mean the end of an entire legislative initiative (or the public humiliation of a legislator), it is easy to see why lawmakers might hesitate
to support expanded use of early release and why discretionary decisionmakers
such as parole boards and prison authorities might be hesitant to exercise their
power to release individual prisoners.
While the use of risk assessment instruments (blunt as they often are, in
both design and execution)16 9 has helped increase the willingness of parole
boards in places like Mississippi to release more individuals labeled as low risk,
experience suggests that attention to risk provides little protection against public
backlash. Recall New Jersey, where, after a "low risk" prisoner was accused of
165

Wis. DEP'T OF CORR., SUMMARY OF ACT 28 RELEASE DATA (Aug. 1, 2011) (on file with

author).
166
Texas has been a national leader in reducing prison growth and increasing community-based
options for nonviolent offenders. See MARC LEVIN, TEXAS CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: LOWER
CRIME,
LOWER
COST,
TEX.
PUB.
POL'Y
INST.
(2010),
available
at

http://www.texaspolicy.com/pdf/2010-01-PPO4-justicereinvestment-ml.pdf Notably, the strategies it has employed thus far have relied only lightly on reducing the sentences of the alreadyimprisoned by increasing parole rates for those already eligible. See generally COUNCIL OF STATE
Gov'T JUSTICE CTR., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT IN TEXAS: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE 2007

JUSTICE

REINVESTMENT

INITIATIVE,

(2009),

available

at

http://justicereinvestment.org/files/TexasBulletin.pdf.
167
168

See supraParts III.B.-C.
See supra, Part III.B.

169

See Brian Joseph, Parolee Risk Software Criticized; State Report Blames UCI-Developed
Computer Programfor Letting Violent Inmates Go Unsupervised Upon Release, ORANGE COUNTY
REG. (May 27, 2011), availableat Westlaw, 2011 WLNR 10665546.
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murder, the governor held a press conference singling out the author of the law
that had provided the accused murderer with the opportunity to transition to the
community under supervision six months before his sentence expired: "Because
of Assemblywoman Watson Coleman's philosophy on crime," the governor
70
charged, "we now have one person who has lost his life."1 When the political
consequences of error are that public, it is understandable why decisionmakers
are hesitant to utilize early release laws to their full capacity.
The third, and perhaps most important, reason why early release efforts
fail to endure is purely normative. Releasing a prisoner before his sentence is
complete is a practice that stands in tension with the determinate sentencing
philosophies of many jurisdictions, and with the overall punitive sentiment that
animates penal policy even in many indeterminate sentencing jurisdictions."'
For the most part, truth in sentencing gained popularity because its advocates
believed that it really did offer "truth" to victims of crime and to the public.
From this perspective, people deserve to know with certainty that when a judge
imposes a sentence of ten years, he means ten years and not "five years to discretionary release and then two and a half more until mandatory parole, for a
total of five to seven and a half years, minus an extra twenty percent for good
time, for a total of four to six years imprisonment." Although lawmakers may
justify early release measures as short-term necessities, they are likely to retain
grave misgivings about the justice of early release practices absent some indication that early release laws will not impede the public's desire for truth in sentencing. 172 This moral conflict may explain why states like Washington and
Kansas have tolerated modest early release measures, but have rejected attempts
to expand release opportunities that more significantly shorten court-imposed
sentences. 173
In a similar way, lawmakers may be morally reticent to support any
laws that they believe will unreasonably endanger the public. While it is easy to
dismiss many appeals to public safety by early release opponents as political
posturing,17 4 the practice of early release does have obvious and important im170
Glenn Townes, Christie Pulls the Plug on Early Release Program for Inmates,
http://findarticles.com/p/news-articles/new-york-amsterdam-news/mi_8153/is_20110609/christiepulls-plug-early-release/ain57725353/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
171
For a discussion of the retributive philosophical considerations underlying the harsh sentencing policies that have come to define much of modem American penal practice, see generally

DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY (2001); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME (2007).
172
For a discussion of recent attempts by the American Law Institute to do just that, see Margaret Colgate Love & Cecelia M. Klingele, First Thoughts About "Second Look" and Other Sentence Reduction Provisions of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing Revision, 42 U. TOL. L. REV.

(forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1911381.
1

Id.

174

This was the case in Illinois and to a lesser degree in Wisconsin, where the repeal of early

release practices was accompanied by false allegations that the releases made under the laws
enabled serious and widespread crime. See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 91, at 15 (refuting allegations
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plications for public safety. Policymakers behave responsibly when they consider the possible effects of release on past and potential future victims of crime,
and weigh the costs and benefits of any proposed legislation. Unless early release laws are refined in their scope and attentive to victim concerns, they are
unlikely to find support from lawmakers who are working diligently to advance
the public safety of their constituents.
V. MOVING FORWARD
How then should lawmakers respond to the failure of early release efforts? The best response is to learn from failure by ensuring that future efforts at
reform are attentive to concerns over capacity, principle, and justice.17 5
A.

Attention to Capacity

Resources to assist states in their efforts to help those leaving prison are
likely to remain limited into the foreseeable future. As states confront the limitations of their ability to control those leaving prison, whether through rehabilitation or otherwise, they would do well to acknowledge their limits, and to tailor
their release policies accordingly.
One way states might do so is by more carefully targeting for release
those prisoners who pose the least threat to public safety. While most states
purport to do this already-it is, after all, an explanation for the popularity of
evidence-based risk instruments among parole boards-in fact, they do not. The
reality is that decisions about who to release frequently conflate political considerations with behavioral ones. First-time thieves have a reconviction rate of
39.3 percent.1 76 By contrast, first-time murderers have a three-year reconviction
rate of only 12.8 percent. 7 7 Certain prisoners cannot be safely released from
custody, for reasons of safety and punishment both. In many cases, however, it
is possible to identify murderers, sex offenders, and other "violent felons" who
could be released without threat to the public. The battered spouse who murthat the MGT-Push policy was responsible for commission of new violent offenses); Fanlund,
supra note 116 (quoting former D.O.C. Secretary Rick Raemisch, pushing back against allegations that prisoners released early were unusually dangerous: "It was not like a bunch of left-wing,
granola-eating, Kumbaya-singing people decided for whatever reason to let dangerous criminals
out .... For the most part these people became productive members of society").
175 For a more instrumental response to the failure of early release legislation, see Norris,supra
note 101, at 47 (outlining four principles for effectiveness, including the use of internal controls to
guard against arbitrariness or racial bias; engagement in "strategic, responsive governance to
ensure that early release actually results in a substantial number of inmates being released" early;
prevention of threats to public safety in the release decisionmaking process; and pursuit of prison
population reductions through other means consistent with public safety).
176

Howard N. Snyder & Joseph Mulako-Wangota, Prisoner Recidivism, BUREAU OF JUST.

STAT., www.bjs.gov. (last visited Oct. 8, 2011) (generated using the Arrest Data Analysis Tool).
P7
Id.
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dered after years of abuse, the sex offender who had consensual intercourse with
a minor classmate ... these individuals are often kept imprisoned not because of
the safety risk they pose, but because of the political risk they pose to those who
might release them.
If lawmakers were truly interested in releasing individuals who pose the
lowest risk of re-offense, they would not categorically exclude individuals convicted of violent or sexual offenses, since in many cases such offenders pose a
lesser risk of re-offense than do their counterparts convicted of less serious
crimes. Because political considerations weigh heavy on lawmakers, however,
and because releasing murderers or sex offenders or others convicted of violent
offenses is seen as politically risky, lawmakers are unlikely to release the individuals who are actually least likely to recidivate, favoring instead those more
likely to re-offend, but in ways that are less controversial or potentially dangerous, even when the risk of danger is remote.
Another, more modest, response is to be honest about capacity constraints. The state cannot guarantee that people leaving prison will not commit
new offenses, whether or not they leave prison early. What lawmakers can do is
craft early release laws that are modest in scope and attentive to risk. Too often,
legislators eager to obtain immediate cost-savings from early release programs
fail to ensure the soundness of the laws they draft. The most extreme examples
are laws drafted so hastily that they do not say what legislators believe them to
say. It is not unusual to read reports of state legislatures scrambling to close
"loopholes" in early release legislation that would otherwise permit the release
of inappropriate candidates, as happened several years ago in Oregon and New
York, where prisoners convicted of violent crimes were released under provisions intended for lower level nonviolent prisoners.178
Actual mistakes are not the only kinds of errors commonly found in early release legislation, however. Often, lawmakers fail to ensure that laws contain
appropriate safeguards to provide meaningful checks against release in inappropriate cases. Early release laws often fail to identify mechanisms for notice to
victims or other interested parties or offer standards for discretionary release
determinations. Some, like the provisions of Wisconsin's Act 28, are unclear
with respect to their interaction with one another, and with respect to the final
decisionmaker.17 9 Clarity in these procedural aspects of the early release deciSee, e.g., Or. Editorial Bd., Oregon is Too Free With Get Out of Jail Early Cards, THE
at
available
2009),
8,
(Dec.
OREGONIAN,
http://www.oregonlive.com/opinionlindex.ssf/2009/12/oregon-is too-free with get-ou.html
(describing law designed to provide early release for nonviolent felons that contained loopholes
enabling felons convicted of more than a dozen different violent crimes to secure release); Cara
Mat, State Seeks to Close Early-Release Loopholefor Violent Felons, THE J. NEWS, Nov. 9, 2009,
at AWPR. 1, availableat Westlaw, 2009 WLNR 22418800 (reporting on efforts by Gov. Patterson
to "remove a glitch in the law that allows violent, repeat felons to become eligible for parole earlier than intended.").
17
See supra Part III.C.
178
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sion is essential to ensuring that early release laws and the decisions that flow
from them are perceived to be reasonable and fair.
B.

Attention to Clarity

It has long been conventional wisdom that "back door" release mechanisms are more politically palatable than front end changes in sentencing practice
because they are less visible to the public. 80 From this perspective, politicians
and lawmakers can save face by pushing for harsher criminal laws and longer
sentences in public, while quietly acquiescing to early release at the back end of
the sentence, allowing parole boards to make more fiscally sensible and morally
sensitive determinations about the proper sentence length at a later time, when
no one is watching.
The reality, however, appears to be the inverse. The controversy that led
to the suspension of Illinois' MGT and other early release programs demonstrates the degree to which the public and the political system react to decisions
that appear arbitrary or otherwise illegitimate. The mere allegation that the
MGT-Push program was "secret"-that it operated outside of the law-was
enough to cause immediate panic on the part of legislators and the public. Early
release failed in large part because of the allegation that release decisions were
"secret" and that they thwarted judicially-imposed sentences by allowing prisoners to avoid serving any significant period of incarceration at all. Even though
the reality differed in important ways from the story told by the press, the public
was led to believe that Illinois's MGT-Push policy (and, by extension, all early
release mechanisms being used in Illinois) did not adequately punish prisoners
18
for their crimes and allowed them to avoid accountability for their infractions.m
Consequently, the public was poised to overreact to the news that released prisoners had committed new offenses. It did not matter that the alleged offenders
were serving sentences so short they would have been released before their new
crimes were committed in any event; what mattered was that the system had
"lied" about the punishment that attached to the crime. Because the practice (as
translated through the media) appeared to permit persons sentenced to prison to
leave without serving any significant time at all, it lacked all features of legitimacy.
If policymakers want to craft sustainable early release laws, they must
be attentive to questions of clarity. Unless laws operate transparently and rely on
explicitly-stated criteria that the public deems fair, they are unlikely to persist.
The Illinois experience reflects this reality, and to a lesser degree, so does the

See, e.g., Josh Farley, Will the State Bring Back Half-Off Sentences for Good Behavior?,
KITSAP SUN, Oct. 10, 2010, availableat Westlaw, 2010 WLNR 20228308 (quoting University of
Washington School of Law professor Mary Fan on Washington's early-release laws: "If, on the
back end, you quietly open the door wider, it's less controversial.").
181
See supra Part II.B.
180
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failure of early release in Wisconsin and Washington.1 82 Overcoming the political obstacles to early release-particularly the fear of public backlash-requires
more than clarity of process, however. It also requires attention to normative
principles about what factors might justify recalibration of that punishment after
a sentence has been imposed.' 83 In the context of decarceration through early
release, that means policymakers must be willing to engage with questions of
theory more often discussed in the classroom (or pulpit) than in judicial chambers or the halls of the state capitol. First, they must take time to identify the
proper uses of imprisonment as a sanction for crime (ordinarily, just desert and
incapacitation). Then, having made explicit for themselves and the public the
reasons that may permit a convicted person to be imprisoned, decisionmakers
must confront the question whether (and, if so, when and why) it is ever proper
to alter such a sentence after it has been imposed. Such engagement might take
many forms: formal symposia, informal listening sessions with stakeholders
and constituents, focus group studies, or deliberative polls. Engagement of the
media might also play a role in educating the public about the need for change
and the practical effects of failure to reduce prison populations.
The American Law Institute's ongoing revision of the Model Penal
Code's sentencing provisions provides an example of what the product of such
deliberation might produce. Following years of conversation among practitioners, judges, and policymakers, the proposed code introduces three separate statutory mechanisms for reducing sentences in determinate sentencing systems.18 4
The first mechanism provides for the accrual of sentence reduction credits of up

182
In his first budget address, the newly-elected Wisconsin Governor promised: "As we refocus government, public safety remains a priority. Our budget will restore truth in sentencing by
repealing the early release program approved by the last administration." Trans. of Gov. Scott
Walker' Budget Address (as prepared for delivery) (Mar. 1, 2011), available at
http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/article217dffce-444e- 11 eO-b6e7001cc4c03286.html#ixzzldkKHMP65. The perception of many was that that the smorgasbord of
new early release laws confounded the essence of truth in sentencing. See, e.g., Scott Bauer, Prison Release Gets a Second Look: Nonviolent Inmates Let Out to Cut Costs, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, May 5, 2010, at B3, availableat Westlaw, 2010 WLNR 9339450. One Washington State
Senator "said the state's residents have an expectation of 'clear and definitive' sentences by a
judge. 'I think the public likes truth in sentencing . . . . I think you ought to behave yourself anyway and be penalized for not behaving."' Josh Farley, Will the State Bring Back Half-Off Sentences for Good Behavior?, KITSAP SUN, Oct. 10, 2010, available at Westlaw, 2010 WLNR
20228308.
183
In engaging with the public, whether through the media or more directly, policymakers
should seek to form "reflective, informed" public judgment, and not merely gauge "shallow, unconsidered" public opinion. Research has consistently demonstrated that public judgment, while
more difficult to capture than public opinion is at once more nuanced and durable. See David A.
Green, Public Opinion Versus PublicJudgment About Crime: Correctingthe 'Comedy ofErrors,'
46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 131, 132 (2006). Research suggests that in the criminal justice context
public judgment is sensitive not only to the risks of community supervision, but also to the risks
that attend incarceration of some offenders.
184
Love & Klingele, supra note 172, at 26-28.
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to 30 percent of a prisoner's sentence.' 85 The second authorizes early release
where "compelling" changes in a particular prisoner's circumstances suggest
that it would be unjust to require the prisoner to complete his term of confinement. 1 6 The third introduces a mechanism for reducing the sentence of prisoners serving extremely lengthy periods of confinement.'8 7 With respect to each
mechanism, the Code specifies a decisionmaker, standards for the award of credit or the release decision, and the procedures to be used in seeking and obtaining release.' 88 The accompanying commentary is rich, with its discussion of the
place each mechanism might hold in a determinate sentencing system, and with
an evaluation of the empirical and normative justifications for release under
each mechanism.' 89 This model legislation offers not only a legislative template,
but lays out the practical and theoretical questions with which states should
grapple as they develop policies on early release and draft legislation to implement it. 190
185
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.1 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011, as approved by the
Am. Law Inst. 88th Annual Meeting, May 17, 2011). Prisoners "shall receive credits of [ 15] percent of their full terms of imprisonment as imposed by the sentencing court, including any portion
of their sentence served in jail rather than prison, and any period of detention credited against
sentence . . . ." Id. § 305.1(1). "Prisoners shall receive additional credits of up to [15 percent of
their full terms of imprisonment as imposed by the sentencing court] (120 days] for satisfactory
participation in vocational, educational, or other rehabilitative programs." Id. § 305.1(2).
186
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.7(1) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011, as approved by
the Am. Law Inst. 88th Annual Meeting, May 17, 2011) provides that "[a]n offender under any
sentence of imprisonment shall be eligible for judicial modification of sentence in circumstances
of the prisoner's advanced age, physical or mental infirmity, exigent family circumstances, or
other compelling reasons warranting modification of sentence." The provision requires the department of corrections to notify prisoners of their right to petition "when it becomes aware of a
reasonable basis for a prisoner's eligibility," and to "provide prisoners with adequate assistance
for the preparation of applications." Id. § 305.7(2). Trial courts have discretion in deciding whether to hold a hearing before ruling on petitions and must render their decisions within a reasonable
time of the hearing, stating the reasons for the decisions on the record. Id. § 305.7(6). A court may
modify a sentence if it "finds that the circumstances of the prisoner's advanced age, physical or
mental infirmity, exigent family circumstances, or other compelling reasons, justify a modified
sentence in light of the purposes of sentencing . . . ."Id § 305.7(7).
187
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011, as approved by the
Am. Law Inst. 88th Annual Meeting, May 17, 2011) sets forth "Principles for Legislation" relevant to modifying lengthy prison sentences. It provides that "[t]he legislature shall authorize a
judicial panel or other judicial decisionmaker to hear and rule upon applications for modification
of sentence from prisoners who have served 15 years of any sentence of imprisonment," permitting courts to modify sentences as if the prisoner were being resentenced "in light of present circumstances. The inquiry shall be whether the purposes of sentencing ... would better be served
by a modified sentence than the prisoner's completion of the original sentence." Id. § 305.6(1),
(4).
188

MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING §§ 305.1, 305.6, 305.7 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011, as
approved by the Am. Law Inst. 88th Annual Meeting, May 17, 2011).
189
See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011, as approved by the Am.
Law Inst. 88th Annual Meeting, May 17, 2011).
190
See Richard F. Frase, Second Look Provisions in the ProposedModel Penal Code Revisions, 21 FED. SENT'G REP. 194, 200 (2009); Love & Klingele, supra note 172.
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As policymakers in each jurisdiction answer for themselves the questions of when and for what reasons early release may be justified, they are likely
to arrive at differing conclusions. One possible conclusion might be that early
release is proper in such a small number of situations that no generally applicable statutory release authority is required because existing mechanisms, such as
pardon, are sufficient to address rare instances of injustice.'91 If that were so,
decisionmakers keen on reducing prison populations (whether for fiscal or moral reasons) would be obliged to achieve their goal in other ways, such as through
front end diversion efforts rather than through backdoor early release measures.192
Another possible conclusion policymakers might reach is that early release is not a good tool for reducing prison populations but should remain an
option for correcting injustices that come to light after the sentence has commenced. Examples of such laws might include compassionate release or other
provisions that enable prisoners to secure review of their sentencing in compelling circumstances, in ways similar to those authorized by Proposed Model Penal Code Sections 305.6 and 305.7.'9'
Pardon, from which parole was originally derived, was once a widely available remedy for
instances in which continued incarceration seemed improper, due either to a prisoner's exemplary
reformation or later-discovered evidence that called into question the justice of the sentence originally imposed. Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1187-90 (2010). Over time, this once strong executive power has weakened
through lack of use, and today instances of pardon are rare to nonexistent in most jurisdictions. Id.
at 1171.
192
Abandoning many forms of early release (particularly those that do not require highly individualized consideration of the risk each particular prisoner may pose) is not equivalent to abandoning all methods of reducing custodial populations. In New Jersey, for example, the same
governor who repealed early release has supported efforts to divert drug offenders from prison,
agreeing to a $3 million increase in the budget for halfway houses. Joelle Farrell, Pa., N.J Officials Question Costs of Tough Sentencing, PHIL. INQUIRER, July 27, 2011, available at
http://articles.philly.com/2011-07-27/news/29820943_1_prison-population-tough-sentencingnonviolent-offenders. The same holds true in Wisconsin. Through a spokesperson, Governor Scott
Walker has indicated that "[riather than letting convicted felons out of prison before they have
191

served their full term,

. .

. [he] plans to reduce the number of individuals incarcerated . .. by pro-

viding district attorneys and judges with flexibility when initially sentencing individuals." Dee J.
Hall, State'sBig PrisonPopulationDrop Called 'Historic',Wis. ST. J., Jan. 13, 2011, availableat
http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/crime andcourts/article a351792c-le97- 11 eO-ba47001cc4c002e0.html. Other jurisdictions have taken a similar position, eschewing early release at
any cost. See Robert Gehrke, Budget Averts Early Release of Prison Inmates, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Mar. 24, 2011, available at http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/home/51400805-76/budget-buildingscounty-early.html.csp (reporting that despite looming budget deficit, the Utah legislature prioritized prisons, allocating $12 million in its most recent budget to "stave off the early release of 384
inmates.").
193
See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (federal provision permitting judicial modification
of sentences for "extraordinary and compelling reasons"); Love & Klingele, supra note 172 (discussing proposed sentence reduction provisions in the Model Penal Code: Sentencing that would
authorize early release in compelling circumstances and provide routine review of sentences longer than 15 years).
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A final possibility is that early release is justified whenever a prisoner
can demonstrate evidence of rehabilitation. This is the unstated rationale behind
the widespread use of "good time" and "earned time" credits in the states and
the continuation of discretionary parole in jurisdictions where it still exists.
While an emphasis on the relevance of rehabilitation to the release decision may
counsel more strongly in favor of shorter sentences or community-based sanctions than it does in favor of sentence reduction, research suggests that there is
strong public support for modest reductions in sentence that improve prisoners'
skills and reduce their risk of recidivism.194
Regardless the conclusions lawmakers reach with respect to the principles that justify release and the process by which release is secured, what matters is that policymakers take time to craft principled legislation. Overcoming
political obstacles to early release is difficult and can only be done when the
public (and policymakers themselves) understand the reasons for early release
laws and the manner in which those laws operate. Increasing the clarity of early
release laws by attending to questions of process and principle is an essential
step toward that goal.
C.

Attention to Justice

Finally, and most importantly, lawmakers who want to reduce prison
populations must frame early release efforts as one small part of a larger and
more important effort to combat the injustices that flow from mass imprisonment. It will always be easy for critics or political opponents to find fault with
existing efforts to reduce the number of people in prison, whether through early
release or other, less controversial methods. Political cowardice, lack of consensus regarding the purpose of imprisonment, and a profound failure of imagination are persistent challenges that confront those who wish to change the scale'
and scope of American punishment. Faced with those obstacles, it is tempting
for policymakers to settle for small "nibbles" at the edge of the problem (as if an
extra 30 days' sentence credit for nonviolent felons will fix the problem of mass

194
The findings of a national voter survey suggest that there is strong public support for reducing sentences by short amounts for nonviolent inmates, especially when such reductions are
framed as ways to enhance public safety.
The survey demonstrates strong support for reducing length of prison stays for
nonviolent inmates when they participate in programs aimed at reducing recidivism, including literacy and substance abuse treatment programs (90% acceptable). Voters also support shortening prison stays by six months for nonviolent inmates who have behaved well and are low-risk for reoffending (90%
acceptable).
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incarceration) or to simply concede defeat.195 But neither option is satisfying for
those who believe that the present scale and scope of incarceration exceeds the
boundaries of just punishment, decreases public safety, and traps poor men,
women, and children in cycles of dysfunction and limited opportunity. 96 If pOlicymakers want to promote lasting change, they must be willing to meet moral
criticisms of early release with normative responses of their own.
Although deep concerns over the injustice of mass incarceration underlie many efforts to reduce overreliance on incarceration, recent efforts to reduce
sentences have often been framed in fiscal terms in order to increase their perceived political palatability. Politicians and policymakers have asserted that
decreasing the prison population is a way to be "smart on crime" and to demonstrate fiscal stewardship over dwindling state resources. 197 While these statements technically may be true, and while they may persuade the public to support such measures in the short term, they are unlikely to be satisfactory justifications for practices that are not also seen as fundamentally fair.
Michael Tonry has best articulated this challenge:
For the past 40 years, most advocates for humane criminal justice policies have made the fundamental mistake of arguing disingenuously. Instead of arguing that unduly harsh policies are
unjust, and should be repealed or modified for that reason, they
much more often argued that policies-which they believed to
be unjust-should be changed because they are ineffective or
too costly. Proposed alternatives-exemplified by most reentry
initiatives-are generally supported by arguments about reduced cost or improved recidivism reduction. This is a mistake. 9 8
The reason why "the strategy of disingenuous argument" fails is because cost is
not the primary concern of those who favor harsher sentencing policies.' 99 Instead, Tonry explains, those who support a tough-on-crime response believe
their policies are "morally justifiable."20 o Whether on grounds of retribution,
195 See Tonry, supra note 160, at 637 (discussing the weaknesses of overreliance
on financial
pressure and the promise of evidence-based predictive tools to produce sustained change in American prison policy).
196
See supra Part II.A.
197
See THE SMART ON CRIME COAL., SMART ON CRIME: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS,
198

availableat http://www.besmartoncrime.org/pdf/Complete.pdf.

See Tonry, supra note 160, at 637.

199

Id

200

Id. at 638.
Given a choice between doing what seems morally right and doing something
else, most people prefer the morally satisfying choice, even if it costs more. If
the morally preferable choice is rejected because it seems unaffordable, it is
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justice to victims, or public protection, many of those who favor long sentences-whether legislators or ordinary citizens-believe that the policies they
favor are the most just. From this perspective, it is efforts to shorten sentences
and release prisoners that are morally deficient and dishonest.
Tonry has it right when he suggests that lasting reductions in the scale
and scope of imprisonment will only occur if policymakers change perceptions
about the justice of current penal policy. To do that, "[t]he ultimately moral arguments about disproportionate punishments, ruined lives, and social injustice
need to be made explici[t]." 2 01 Insofar as current reform efforts are motivated
primarily by financial pressures, they are doomed to failure on several fronts.
Lasting changes in carceral policy will require more than simply reducing sentences by a few days here and there, or even shortening periods of community
supervision. They will require a wholesale scaling down of custodial penalties, a
rethinking of the ways in which punishment might be imposed in the community rather than behind bars, reconsideration of the kinds of behavior to which the
criminal justice system should respond, and reevaluation of the ways in which
the resources of the criminal justice system are deployed.202 While early release
measures may play a peripheral role in those efforts, the changes needed are
much larger. Political will to make such changes, and public support to sustain
them, is only likely to occur if people believe that they are fair to victims, offenders, and the larger community.
When policymakers frame changes in carceral policy primarily as stop
gap budgetary measures and only secondarily as the right response to criminal
offending, they do not advance the interests of those they serve or the deeper
convictions that animate their efforts. In order to create sustainable changes in
sentencing and law and correctional policy, lawmakers must be able to justify
reductions in sentences by reference to principles of justice. Ultimately, it is
crafting principled laws and placing them in a broader conversation about the
fundamental fairness of modern sentencing practice that is most likely to overcome moral obstacles to reducing prison populations through sentence reduction.
VI. CONCLUSION
Early experiments with early release mechanisms have raised concerns
over the sustainability of a back-end approach to criminal justice reform, and
rightly so. The failure of many early release laws can be explained by the fact
with a feeling of regret, an uncomfortable sense of doing the wrong thing for
the wrong reason. Given the chance later on to do the right thing, most
people-I believe-would jump at the chance.
Id. at 639.
201
Id. at 638.
202
See generally Cecelia Klingele, Michael S. Scott, & Walter J. Dickey, Reimagining Criminal Justice, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 953 (2010).
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that lawmakers want too much from them, hoping for long term cost-savings,
robust implementation, and public acceptance of the practice without any explanation of the reasons why release (and its attendant risks) might be justified.
Future experiments with early release may be met with greater success if lawmakers take care to acknowledge the limitations of early release mechanisms in
producing significant reductions in prison populations; identify for themselves
and their constituents the principles that might justify early release; and frame
early release efforts as one tool in the larger effort to correct the injustices that
arise from mass incarceration. Should they do so, perhaps it will soon be possible to conclude that reports of the demise of early release were somewhat exaggerated.20 3

203

With apologies to Samuel Clemens.
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